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Many utility customers would be surprised to learn that the company providing them with gas or electricity might also be involved in
the insurance, banking, qr real estate business. Yet, more and more
energy utilities are diversifying' from traditional natural monopolies
into a number of unregulated fields in the competitive sector of the
economy. This trend toward diversification, while by no means purely
a recent development, shows signs of acceleration 2 and presents a sig• B.A. 1984, Washington and Lee University; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 Any business activity falling outside of the traditional utility functions of generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical or gas energy is considered a diverse
activity. See Ferrar, Business Diversification:An Option Worth Considering, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Jan. 7, 1982, at 13, 17.
2 See Murray & Closterman, How Utilities Are Becoming New Conglomerates,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 7, 1986, at 11, 11 ("The number of mergers and acquisitions
completed by [all utilities] in 1985 was 38 per cent higher than in 1984 .... In fact,
since 1983, the number of utility mergers and acquisitions has increased 63 per cent
versus a 35 per cent increase for all industries."); Sponseller, An Overview of Utility
Reorganization Activity, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 15, 1987, at 42, 42.
Analysts generally offer two explanations for this flurry of activity. Some observers
believe the primary catalyst is the utilities' strong cash position upon completion of
construction programs. See, e.g., Murray & Closterman, supra, at 11 (financial position of electric utilities is improving due to the expected continuation of the downward
trend in construction expenditures); Trebing, The Impact of Diversification on Economic Regulation, 19 J. EcoN. ISSuES 463, 464 ("The imbalance between lower capital needs and higher cash flow" provides management with the opportunity to diversify.); Daniels, Utilities Are Branching Out, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at D1, col. 2,
D6, col. 2 (Utilities, after canceling plans for more than 150 generating plants in last
decade, are "not about to start a new building cycle."); Tucker, Utilities Diversjfy for
Profits, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1986, at WB1, col. 3, WB1, col. 5 ("Utilities have become
cash cows largely because growth in electricity demand has slowed from about 7 per
cent annually in the 1970s to about 2 per cent today, which means they don't need to
build new plants but still collect ratepayer dollars."); Rose, Utilities, Flush With Cash,
Enter New Fields, Wall St. J., July 1, 1986, at 6, col. 1, 6, col. 1 ("Except for those
troubled by half-finished nuclear plants, utilities are expected to enjoy cash surpluses
for some years to come.").
Other commentators believe that the diversification trend is a result of the utilities'
desire to avoid a hostile regulatory environment, and at the same time, seek greener
(unregulated) pastures. See, e.g., Andrews, Diversification and the Public Utility Holding Company Act, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 23, 1982, at 24, 26 ("Inflation, poor regulatory performance, and nuclear power have all [increased] the perceived risk to investors. .

.

. Diversification . . . can . . . help increase earnings or decrease risk.");

Daniels, supra, at D6, col. 1 ("One response to the regulatory situation . . . is diversification."); Paul, Utilities' Cash Surpluses Spur Investments, Wall St. J., March 26,
(1677)

1678

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 136:1677

nificant challenge to those bodies charged with regulating public
utilities.'
The challenge stems from the decision of many utilities to diversify
through the formation of holding companies, and the resulting segregation of the nonutility subsidiaries from the utility subsidiary. This corporate structure often enables the utility holding company to shield its
nonutility operations from scrutiny by the traditional guardians of utility consumer interests-the state public service commissions ("PSCs").'
Having avoided the regulator's scrutiny, the management of a utility
holding company is in a position to abuse its discretion to the detriment
of ratepayers. 5
In fact, the prevalence of these abuses through the 1920's compelled Congress to pass the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 ("PUHCA" or "Act").' Considered to be "as [complex] a piece of
legislation as Congress perhaps has ever enacted, . . . [b]y means of
[which] the Securities and Exchange Commission completely restructured a huge complex industry,"' the PUHCA has been acclaimed as a
success beyond all expectations.' Some view the Act as the paragon of
the sort of obsolete regulation that the Reagan administration was
elected to purge.9 Others, such as the Justice Department, the National
1986, at 6, col. 1, 6, col. 1 ("[Niever has the industry been so opposed to [building] new
plants-mainly out of fear that state regulators ... won't authorize the full recovery
of future plant expenditures."). Still, it is important to recognize that the aggregate
dollar value of diversification is small. See Levy, Utility Diversification, Other Subjects,
and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, in DIVERSIFICATION, DEREGULATION, AND INCREASED UNCERTAINTY IN THE PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES
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(Mich. St. U. Pub. Util. Papers 1983) [hereinafter 1983 MSU PAPERS] (Diversification "has been modest," and for most utilities "is still at initial or programmatic
stages."); Murray & Closterman, supra, at 12 (non-utility activity profits seldom exceed five percent of a diversified utility's consolidated profits).
' "A public utility is a monopoly enterprise that renders a public service and so is
invested with a public interest; the nonutility company is not. This union leads to regulatory complications and potential risks affecting consumers that need to be understood
and acknowledged." Levy, supra note 2, at 563.
" The name given to these public service commissions is not nationally uniform.
For simplicity and consistency, they will be referred to as PSCs in this Comment.
' The existence of a profit motive enhances the potential for abuse. See infra text
accompanying notes 38-40; see also infra notes 45-76 and accompanying text (detailing
potential abuses of the holding company structure).
6 Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 79-79z-6 (1982)).
' Sommer, Public Utility Holding Company Act: Is There a Dance in the Old
Girl Yet?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 28, col. 1, 28 col. 1.
a See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text. The restrictions of the PUHCA
have compelled many utilities to dissolve their holding companies or to restructure their
operations in such a way as to qualify for one of the exemptions under the Act. To the
extent that this restructuring has curbed the potential for the abuses that prompted
passage of the PUHCA, the Act is considered a success. See id.
" See id.; Brown & Bink, Special Report: The Movement for Repeal of the Public
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Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, and consumer lobbying groups argue for retention of the PUHCA.' ° The debate over the
propriety and fate of the PUHCA remains muted, probably because
consumers have yet to feel much direct impact of the diversification
trend. Meanwhile, most states approach regulation of diversification by
utility holding companies on an ad hoc basis, if at all.
The time to define the permissible scope and form of utility diversification is now, before public utilities commit large amounts of resources and before regulators are faced with a crisis situation.1" Part I
of this Comment explores the pros and cons of public utility diversification, concluding that under the proper conditions, diversification can
benefit both the ratepayers and the utility shareholders. Part II summarizes the inadequacies of existing diversification regulation, suggesting
that effective regulation depends upon access to information that utilities are reluctant to provide and that this paucity of information hampers state regulatory efforts. Finally, Part III proposes a model statute,
enumerating the powers essential to effective state regulation of utility
diversification.
I.

PUBLIC UTILITIES AND DIVERSIFICATION

A.

Should We Permit Diversification At All?

Diversification is neither such an obvious evil as to warrant its
outright prohibition nor such an unmitigated good as to justify regulatory inaction. It seems that for every industry argument in favor of
diversification, there is an opposing regulatory response. 2 As a general
matter, the principal focus of the proponents of diversification is the
investment community. Opponents, on the other hand, are primarily
Utility Holding Company Act, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 13, 1982, at 42, 42-43.
10 See id. at 43-44. Absent the existence of the PUHCA, utility holding companies
would have little incentive to simplify their organizational structures. The resulting
complex structures, particularly those extending across state lines, would be outside the
effective regulatory reach of state PSCs. See Buchanan, The Public Utility Holding
Company Problem, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 517, 541 (1937) (asserting that "holding companies are not usually incorporated in, or doing business in, the states where their subsidiaries operate [and this fact] raises further legal barriers to direct state regulation").
Il Furthermore, uncertainty regarding the permissible extent and forms of diversification may be costing consumers money. See Buck & Groth, Regulatory Uncertainty
and the Cost of Capitalfor Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 20, 1986, at 23, 24-25.
Buck and Groth conclude that "perceived uncertainty about regulation will add to capital costs regardless of the regulatory decisions that materialize [and] absent an external
subsidy, the costs must flow through to the final consumer." Id.
12 See D. HAWES, UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES §§ 6.02-.03 (1987) (listing
opposing utility
diversification).
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concerned with ratepayer interests. Specifically, the opponents assert
that diversification into risky businesses may needlessly subject the utility and its ratepayers to financial loss. It may be appropriate, therefore,
for legislation to contain some limitation on acceptable areas for
diversification.
Proponents cite numerous potential benefits from diversification-some economic, others less quantifiable. Among the economic
benefits, the following are frequently mentioned:
1. synergies with other corporate resources such as land,
computer programs, and customer bases;"3
2. use of nonutility earnings to exploit tax benefits earned
through utility investments and operations; 4
3. increased demand for utility power resulting from construction of buildings that will consume the power produced
by the utility; 5
4. stabilization of utility earnings through investments in industries countercyclical to the utility business;"
3 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 2, at 27 ("Corporate resources such as land,
computer programs and customer bases may be very worthwhile utility assets that have
the potential to be used in other profitable businesses."); Catalano, Utilities Begin to
Show Profits From Diversification Ventures, POWER, Aug. 1984, at 73, 74 (discussing
consulting work, which "would provide an efficient use of the company's personnel and
equipment assets"); Trebing, supra note 2, at 465 ("[P]roponents of diversification
claim that management can achieve an operational synergism by combining different
skills, expertise, and resources to raise productivity and earnings . .. ").
14 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 2, at 27 ("In certain situations, nonutility earnings can have an extra plus in those utilities that are currently unable to take full
advantage of liberal tax benefits earned through utility investments and operations.");
Shaw, Diversification: Risks and Rewards, in 1983 MSU PAPERS, supra note 2, at
515, 518-19 ("[D]iversification can be used to provide income to offset tax credits generated by the core business.").
"5See Daniels, supra note 2, at D6, col. 3. The Florida Progress Corporation is a
minority partner in a group seeking to bring a major league baseball team to its service
area. "Company officials said that they were interested in baseball because St. Petersburg and Pinellas County have pledged to build an air-conditioned domed stadium for
the team. That stadium would be a big user of electricity." Id.; see also Tucker, supra
note 2, at WB17, col. 2 (utilities' real estate investments "lead[] to increased use of
electricity").
" See, e.g., Public Utility Holding Company Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R.
2994 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservationand Power and the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 House Hearings] (statement of John W. Barr, Principal, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.) ("Diversification can provide another base of earnings to reduce the risks associated with exposure
to a single line of business."); D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 6.02, at 6-2 ("Diversification into countercyclical businesses can improve market performance."). But see NATIONAL ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'RS, 1982 REPORT OF THE AD Hoc
COMM. ON UTIL. DIVERSIFICATION 27 [hereinafter 1982 NARUC REPORT] (This
argument is limited to diversification into fields "that are subject to very different exter-
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5. ability to attract investors and reduce the cost of securing
capital by offering the combination of stable earnings from
the low-risk utility business and variable earnings from a
riskier business."
Analysts also tout less quantifiable benefits such as the ability to attract
more ambitious and effective managers, lured by the exciting prospects
of managing a diversified conglomerate rather than a staid utility.,8
This latter argument, however, breaks down under closer scrutiny.
Some utility executives make much of the exciting possibilities in
(what is for them) the new frontier of unregulated businesses. 9 Others
argue that "[gletting into areas that aren't energy-related isn't smart if
the buyer has to rely on the management of the company he acquires." 2 But it is not clear that diversifying utilities follow this advice.
Take, for example, Florida Power & Light's acquisition of Colonial
Penn Insurance Co. for $566 million in 1985, ostensibly to take advantage of the synergies inherent in the fact that both were service-oriented
businesses. 1 Although interaction between utility and nonutility executives purportedly can "tone up management through new challenges
nal economic shocks" and are, unfortunately, fields where the utility is less likely to
enjoy special expertise over others.).
11 See D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 6.02, at 6-2; see also 1983 House Hearings,
supra note 16, at 45-46 (acknowledging the attractiveness of diversification, but noting
that utilities are far riskier than they were decades ago); Andrews, supra note 2, at 2627 (same). Some analysts argue, however, that the status of a utility's nuclear program
is a more important determinant of its perception among investors than its decision to
diversify. See Trebing, supra note 2, at 466; see also Phillips, The ChangingStructure
of the Public Utility Sector, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 9, 1986, at 13, 20 ("[Eyxcept for a
few-and well-known-electrics with nuclear problems, the financial integrity of the
public utility sector has improved."); Tracy, A New Power-Company Problem: Too
Much Cash, FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 1984, at 160, 160 (same).
18 See D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 6.02, at 6-2; Andrews, supra note 2, at 27;
Kahn, Utility Diversification, 4 ENERGY J. 149, 153 (1983).
19 For particularly effusive commentary, see the statement of Thomas A. Page of

San Diego Gas & Electric in Electric Utility Commissioners Forum: CorporateStructure, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 28, 1987, at 82, 87. See also NATIONAL ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'RS, 1972 REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMM. ON NON-UTILITY
INVESTMENTS: DIVERSIFICATION BY UTILITY COMPANIES 5 [hereinafter 1972
NARUC REPORT] (utility argument that new employees may be easier to recruit if

business enters fields offering enlarged opportunities for challenge and advancement).
20 Tucker, supra note 2, at 17, col. 3 (quoting Donald J. Heim, Chairman,
Washington Gas Light Co.).
21 See Rose, supra note 2, at 6, col. 3. It is difficult to believe that synergies exist
between FPL and all service-oriented industries. Indeed, that statement proves too
much, particularly in light of the comments of the Colonial Penn CEO concerning the
acquisition. See infra text accompanying note 23. It is not surprising, then, that the
whole notion of management synergies is being questioned. See Trebing, supra note 2,
at 467 ("There appear to be few areas [for energy utilities] . . . where the expertise
associated with administering a large-scale, capital intensive firm will be of unique
value when combined with that of a nonregulated manufacturing or retail firm.").
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and the introduction of new people and skills," 22 the comments of Colonial Penn's CEO soon after the announced acquisition suggest that no
such benefit will materialize: "It's really a natural move for us. We'll
be under the leadership of the holding company. We'll be completely
independent and we'll maintain our headquarters and our management. [The management of FP&L neither] knows anything about the
insurance business [nor] pretends to know anything about the insurance
business."2 " One also wonders how much interaction will occur between Colonial Penn's employees in Philadelphia and FP&L's employees in Florida.2 4
The real motivation behind much of this diversification is the desire to divert surplus cash into unregulated industries in pursuit of
higher profits than are currently available from traditional utility
fields.25 Given adequate safeguards for ratepayers, such a motive is ac22 See D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 6.02, at 6-2. The utilities cite the lack of
ferment in their industry to explain their inability to attract bright young minds. See
Sommer, Is the 1935 Act a Barrier to Diversification?, in 1983 MSU PAPERS, supra
note 2, at 533, 537 ("Many companies confined to the utility industry sensed difficulty
in recruiting young executives and motivating them in the face of the restraints on the
activities in which utility employees could engage."). Other observers, however, point
out unprecedented challenges to the utility industry, which one assumes might stimulate
interest. See Phillips, supra note 17, at 14 (summarizing 11 major changes in the industry's operating environment during the course of the 197 0's).
If there is so little challenge in the industry, why has performance been so dismal?
See A High Risk Erafor the Utilities, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 23, 1981, at 76, 76 (utility
industry "going from bad to worse"). It is true that some pin the blame on the regulators. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. Ironically, there are signs of improvement just as the utilities are citing their poor prospects to justify forays into unregulated fields. See Shepherd, Comments, in 1983 MSU PAPERS, supra note 2, at 592
("[m]ost of these problems now appear to be past or solved"); The Utilities' Biggest
Fan, FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1986, at 164, 164 ("[nor the most part those problems have
disappeared"); Tracy, supra note 17, at 160 (discussing strong cash position of
utilities).
23 Colonial Penn Chief Welcomes Utility Tie, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1985, at D2,
col. 5, D2, cols. 5-6.
24 One proponent of diversification advises utilities "to build physical/geographical barriers [between utility and nonutility personnel] to minimize the tendency of the
utility people to 'look over their shoulders.'" Shaw, supra note 14, at 531.
25 For example, the president of a diversifying utility recently stated:
[T]his nation has been sending the utility industry a message . . .that
says, "You build at your own-enormous-risk." . . . So, what have we
been doing? We've been looking for ways to diversify. My own company
has created a subsidiary for the specific purpose of seeking out new opportunities . . . in ventures that offer a chance to earn better returns than we
can expect in our traditional regulated business.
Address by A.W. Dahlberg, President, Southern Co. Servs. Inc., Energy Technology
Conference, Wash., D.C. (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 52 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY 442, 444 (1986); see also Shaw, supra note 14, at 518 ("[M]ost utility managers
would not even consider diversifying if they could earn a reasonable return on their
utility assets.").
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ceptable to regulators because success in the venture could translate into
reduced energy costs for ratepayers.2 6
Unfortunately, it is clear that the potential for failure also exists:
A McKinsey & Co. study of 58 corporate acquisitions between 1975 and 1985 found that only six were successsful.
The remainder were about equally split between clear failures and indeterminate results. The acquisitions that worked
best, the study found, were small purchases in a line of business similar to the acquiring company.2"
While it is true that this survey considered diversification into all business fields, many of which are riskier than areas utilities might enter, it
remains open to question whether utility executives can outperform
their counterparts in unregulated industries when it comes to picking
prospects for acquisition.2" In addition, there is other evidence that
"mergers tend to be associated with an unexpected increase in the levels
2 For example, it has been observed that the economics of energy utilities permit
"increases in inputs [to be] accompanied by greater than proportional increases in production." K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND FINANCING
36 (1982). Additionally, "[w]ith greater diversity of customer groups, capacity is better
utilized and average costs are lower." Id. at 37. It follows that a utility diversifying into
businesses that somehow enhance production demand (e.g., land development) may also
reduce the cost of producing energy to the overall community. The proposal to finance
the building of a domed baseball stadium is an example of this kind of economy. &e
supra note 15.
217Rose, supra note 2, at 6, col. 3.
28 Some opponents of diversification contend that "nonutility business investment
'is almost certain to be more risky than utility investment.'" Answer of Wisconsin's
Environmental Decade to Response of Applicant to Comments and Request for Hearing at 12, WPL Holding, Inc., SEC Admin. Proc. 70-7385 (Nov. 25, 1987) (quoting
Douglas Randall, Senior Vice President of Standard & Poors, testifying before the Economic Development Committee of the Wisconsin Legislature (June 12, 1985)). Wisconsin's Environmental Decade is contesting WPL's application for exemption of its
holding company from the PUHCA. The group cited WPL's investment in Ciphrex,
Inc., a firm that bought rights to certain toll-free (800) numbers that were the acronyms of major corporations, as an example of the dangers of diversification. See id.
Ciphrex would sell the number to the corporation when, and if, it decided it needed an
800 number with its acronym. The result has been "little profit" and a protracted legal
battle-with Ciphrex litigating a claim against WPL for $75 million. See id.
The reasons utility diversification is riskier include:

substitution of freely competitive markets for an exclusive franchise; the
presence of products, services and customers which differ from traditional
utility products, services and customers; and the need for management
skills, like entrepreneurship, which differ from those needed to operate a
utility business. . . . [Also, it is] the nature of non-utility business startups to suffer losses in the early years, and to experience high rates of
failure.
Id. at 13.

1684

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 136:1677

of risk for the consolidated enterprise." 2
In a worst-case scenario, failure of the diversification enterprise
could lead to the utility's inability to raise capital.30 Some opponents
argue that ratepayers will not share commensurately in the benefits if
the nonutility venture succeeds, and they will surely suffer when the
nonutility business falters."1 This danger is greatest where the utility is
not insulated from the diversification ventures, for instance, when the
diversification is carried out within the utility, or by a subsidiary of the
utility.-2 On the other hand, an essential characteristic of the holding
company structure is the ability to segregate the finances of the utility
from the nonutility business; but this characteristic depends on the use
rather than abuse of the holding company structure.3 3
Of course, no rational person enters a business expecting failure,
and utility ratepayers and investors can profit from properly managed
diversification. In light of the potential benefits, the 1982 Report of
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
("NARUC") summarized the issue best in concluding:
Prohibiting diversification eliminates the possibility of harm
to ratepayers. This action is drastic and most likely not warranted. .

.

. [T]here is no reason to assume that all diversifi-

cation ventures will be to the detriment of ratepayers ...
The regulatory decision on utility diversification is, there29 Trebing, supra note 2, at 466. For a general discussion of recent studies evaluating the benefits and risks of diversification, see id. at 465-67.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to give attention to diversification
schemes other than direct investment, firms seeking to reduce risk and increase return
might construct a diversified stock portfolio rather than invest in diversified operations.
See id. at 467 (suggesting a strategy for individual investors). This is the approach
taken by Consolidated Edison, which recently sought state regulatory approval to form
an in-house investment company to manage a $300 million portfolio. See Paul, supra
note 2, at 6, col. 1. This strategy has the advantages of providing greater liquidity in
the event that an investment starts to falter or the utility faces unexpected capital needs.
See Tucker, supra note 2, at 17, col. 2.
30 See FLORIDA PUB. SERV. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY
DIVERSIFICATION AND TRANSACTIONS WITH AFFILIATED COMPANIES 14 (n.d.) [hereinafter FLORIDA REPORT]; Levy, supra note 2, at 565-66.

"' See 1972 NARUC REPORT, supra note 19, at 23 ("[T]he consumer bears the
risks of failure without any commensurate participation in the benefits of success.").
But see York, Dube, & Malko, Electric Utility Diversification:A State Regulatory
Perspective, in 1983 MSU PAPERS, supra note 2, at 577, 588 (an "important question
for the regulator is how to allow the investor to keep the results of successful diversification without having regulators siphon off these benefits to the monopoly rate
payer.").
32 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text; see also R. RITCHIE, INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES 12 (1955) ("The justification of the
holding company, of course, lies in its use and not in its abuse.").

19881

ENERGY UTILITY DIVERSIFICATION

1685

fore, a question of nature, degree5 and process."'

B.

The Challenge of Regulating Diversification

As guardians of the public interest, regulators are protectors of the
ratepayers. While the holding company structure is the ideal form for
safeguarding the integrity of the utility business, this structure permits
management to abuse its discretion, posing severe consequences for consumers. The regulator's challenge is to preserve the protections of the
holding company format while minimizing the opportunities for abuse.
1. The Holding Company Structure
One of three structural options available to utilities planning to
diversify is the holding company. 5 It is the one that presents the great"' 1982 NARUC REPORT, supra note 16, at 76; see also Kahn, supra note 18, at
150 ("[Dioctrinaire opposition to utility company diversification makes no more sense
than . . . completely abandoning all regulatory protections against its possible harmful
consequences.").

" See O' Connor, Bussa, & Olson, Competition, FinancialInnovation and Diversification in the Electric Industry, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 20, 1986 at 17, 20. The
two alternative corporate structures available to utilities planning to diversify are diversification within the utility and creation of a diversified corporate subsidiary to the
utility. See id.
The choice of corporate structure depends largely on the degree of diversification
contemplated, and whether the diversified operations are functionally related to the
utility business. Diversification within the utility is the preferred form when the activity is functionally related to the utility operations and small in relation to the size of the
utility operations. See id. at 20. The records of the diversified activity are "consolidated
into the utility accounts and [will be] treated by regulators as a part of the regulated
utility operations." Id. at 20; See OFFICE OF CHIEF ECONOMIST OF THE PUB. SERV.
COMM'N OF WISCONSIN, ENERGY UTILITY DIVERSIFICATION, HOLDING COMPANIES,
AND REGULATION 9 (1981) [hereinafter WISCONSIN REPORT]. Because regulators have

full jurisdiction over the diversified activity and any benefits of the diversified venture
necessarily flow to the ratepayers, this arrangement does not present any novel regulatory problem of consequence. The problem of fair and accurate cost allocation, discussed infra notes 47-53, arises under this structure. However, the PSC will necessarily have more information to use in evaluating cost allocations because of its access to
the books of the utility and utility subsidiaries engaged in nonutility businesses.
The second option similarly presents only limited problems for regulators. Under
this structure, the diversified operation is separately incorporated, with the management of the subsidiary either reporting to or being identical to the management of the
utility. See WISCONSIN REPORT, supra, at 9. This organization allows greater autonomy in the management of the diversified venture and a more complete separation of
subsidiary accounts, offering regulators a clearer view of the success or failure of the
venture. The disadvantage of this structure-is the difficulty of separately identifying the
cost of capital attributable solely to the utility-a necessary step in the rate-making
process. See O'Connor, Bussa, & Olson, supra, at 20. Where the subsidiary truly does
keep separate accounts from the parent corporation, it is possible to impute a cost of
capital to the subsidiary.
For example, in Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 193 Col. 421,
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est challenge to regulators and is the primary focus of this paper. Holding companies are frequently formed for the very purpose of avoiding
regulation, 6 and the debate rages as to whether the holding company
structure is in the best interest of the consumer. In adopting the
PUHCA, Congress clearly thought it was not."7
A former member of the SEC, charged with enforcing the
PUHCA, expressed the fear that management would be tempted to
channel funds into the more attractive nonutility operations "and away
from a utility whose earnings and rate of return are considered inadequate." 8 The Maryland Office of the People's Counsel echoed these
concerns, stating that the holding company structure makes it "easier to
funnel money from the utility to other operations."3 9 Furthermore, "if
nonutility subsidiaries incur substantial amounts of debt, and. . . consolidated equity is thereby reduced [to unacceptably low levels], the
holding company might be precluded from raising capital the utility
567 P.2d 377 (1977), the court, although wary of using hypothetical capital ratios, held
that the PSC properly imputed a capital structure. There, the gas distribution division
of a gas utility had no independent capital structure or corporate existence, and all the
distribution subsidiary's capital requirements were provided by the parent. See id. at
424-25, 567 P.2d at 379. The Colorado utilities commission had concluded:
When a utility engages in non-utility operations and finances those operations through its capital structure, of necessity its capital structure changes
and under present conditions those changes ultimately result in a higher
total cost of capital than if there were no non-utility operations, which
materially affects and prejudices the utility ratepayers, because if no adjustments are made, a higher rate of return is required. Therefore, adjustments should be made to the capital structure of [the parent utility] so
that only the utility operations of [the consolidated entity] will be reflected in the capital structure.
Id. at 425-26, 567 P.2d at 380 (quoting the state PSC findings). The court concluded
that it was "within the power of the [PSC] to pierce corporate structures of corporations which also operate nonutility divisions or subsidiaries to impute a capital structure for the utility operation, which is reflective of the capitalization actually backing
the utility operation." Id. at 426, 567 P.2d at 380. Where there is a holding company
structure, the process of imputing a capital structure is easier because of the clear separation between the accounts of the regulated versus the unregulated operations of the
consolidated entity.
8' See Shaw, supra note 14, at 519 ("Moving some of the business outside the
regulator's reach is often cited by utility executives as reason for diversifying."); Trebing, supra note 2, at 465 (formation of holding company places "portions of the enterprise outside the scope of regulatory authority"); Tucker, supra note 2, at WB 17, col.
4 ("Much of the diversification trend has been accompanied by utilities forming holding companies to essentially remove competitive businesses from regulatory scrutiny.").
3 See infra note 85 (discussing abuses leading to passage).
Levy, supra note 2, at 565.
8 Tucker, supra note 2, at WB17, col. 5; see also Levy, supra note 2, at 565 ("It
is not unreasonable to assume that [when diversification leads management to become
more oriented toward nonutility businesses] there will be temptations to channel more
capital into the nonutility company and away from a utility whose earnings and rate of
return are considered inadequate.").
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needs" 4 to maintain service at reasonable levels and prices.
On the other hand, there are also protections for consumers inherent in the holding company form. Under proper conditions,"1 the holding company format facilitates regulation by clearly segregating utility
accounts from nonutility subsidiary accounts and can prevent cross-subsidization.4 2 However, access to the records of the nonutility venture is
critical and is commonly resisted by the holding company. The strongest argument in favor of the holding company format is that the holding
company can act independently from the utility when raising capital for
the diversified activity. If the diversified activity is risky, the cost of
capital will rise. But as long as the diversifying entity is segregated
from the utility, the utility can continue to raise its own capital based
on its own level of risk, and not on that of the potentially riskier diversified subsidiary. Moreover, the cost of capital attributable to the utility
(and ultimately passed on to ratepayers) is easier to determine if the
accounts of the utility are separate from those of the nonutility
venture.4 3
The most important protection for ratepayers under the holding
company structure only materializes when the diversified activity fails
completely. If the diversified activity is consolidated into the accounts of
the utility, failure of the diversified operation results in a direct charge
to utility earnings and has an immediate impact on the financial health
of the utility. With a holding company, however, the utility is insulated
from the setbacks of the diversified operations: "the assets (financial or
real) of the utility cannot be claimed to satisfy the liabilities of the nonutility businesses in the event of poor performance."4 4

41

Levy, supra note 2, at 565-66.
See infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing various conditions state

PSCs attach to diversification activities by holding companies).
42

See 1983 House Hearings,supra note 16, at 58 (statement of William Grigg,

Exec. Vice Pres. of Duke Power Company).
' See O'Connor, Bussa, & Olson, supra note 35, at 21.
Under this approach,
the utility balance sheet is evaluated without regard to the holding company to insure that capital structure ratios fall within acceptable ranges
for an [energy] utility.. . . [Tihe utility cost of capital can be determined

in isolation from the holding company, which is consistent with the goal of
having neither the utility subsidize the non-utility business, nor the

converse.
supra note 30, at 15-16.
""O'Connor, Bussa, & Olson, supra note 35, at 21. This is probably also true if
the utility sets up a subsidiary to conduct diversified operations, but the holding company structure virtually requires this insulation and has the additional attraction of
improved financial flexibility allowing the holding company to pursue diversification
objectives. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 316-17 (statement of Stanley
York, Chairman of 1982 NARUC Ad Hoc Committee on Utility Diversification);
FLORIDA REPORT,
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Forms of Abuse4 5

So long as it is insulated from regulatory scrutiny, the holding
company diversification structure allows management to divert capital
from the utility enterprise to the unregulated venture. Because these
transfers enhance the unregulated enterprise while depleting the utility's resources, they are an abuse of managerial discretion. Abuse also
takes place when the diversified enterprise enjoys an unfair advantage
over competitors by virtue of the powerful backing of the utility.
a.

Cross-Subsidization

"Cross-subsidization" is the term describing any number of practices that benefit utilities or their subsidiaries at the expense of ratepayers, consumers, or other businesses competing with the utility in the
unregulated field. "There are four primary ways in which a subsidy
can pass from the regulated business to a nonregulated activity: improper cost allocation, inflated transfer prices, capitalization of a non' A brief description of
regulated venture, and below market pricing." 46
each of these potential subsidies follows.
(i) Cost Allocation
A fundamental precept to the effective regulation of diversifying
utilities is that "[t]he costs of running a nonregulated venture should be
borne by the customers of that activity, not by the ratepayers." 4 In
practice, this requirement means that the utility should not perform
services for the unregulated subsidiary without being compensated. For
example, if the subsidiary shares office space rented by the utility, the
subsidiary should contribute its pro rata share of the expense. When
officers common to the utility and the unregulated subsidiary work on
subsidiary affairs, that subsidiary should pay the portion of their salary
properly apportionable to their efforts.4 Resource-sharing between the
FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
4 The ratepayer is susceptible to the abuses outlined in this section no matter
what the corporate structure. However, the nature of the holding company format,
where a substantial portion of the utility's business may be with an affiliate beyond
regulatory purview, requires special vigilance on the part of the regulator. Where diversification is organized within the utility or as a wholly-owned subsidiary, the PSC
has access to all the records of the firm. But when the diversification takes the form of a
holding company, the PSC may have trouble gaining access to the business records
necessary to evaluate the fairness of transactions between the utility and its affiliates.
48 Friedlein, Finger, & DeLaney, Utility Companies Expand into New Markets,
N.C. INSIGHT, Jan. 1984, at 13, 16.
47 ld.
48

See id.
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utility and its unregulated subsidiaries should not be eliminated completely, however, for the availability of the utility's underutilized assets
can represent one of the greatest benefits of diversification.49
The North Carolina Public Utilities Commission uncovered an example of cross-subsidization through improper cost allocation in a case
involving Piedmont Natural Gas.50 The utility allowed unregulated
subsidiaries to use utility property without paying rent.51 These and
other subsidies resulted in an overallocation to the utility of $467,000 in
1982.52 While the surcharge worked out to only sixty-nine cents per
customer on an average annual bill of $486," the potential for abuse is
clear where PSCs are less vigilant than in North Carolina.
(ii) Transfer Prices
The second variation of cross-subsidization arises when the utility
establishes a subsidiary that sells a product or service that the utility
itself consumes." The subsidiary has a guaranteed customer base, and
usually a large one at that. If the utility pays higher prices to its own
subsidiary than it would on the open market, the ratepayers in turn
pay higher prices than necessary, effectively subsidizing the unregulated firm.
This sort of subsidy arises most often in the case of vertical integration; for example, when an energy utility buys coal from a mining
subsidiary. However, there is some concern that this particular type of
cross-subsidy may be spreading as utilities set up "separate corporations which deal in 'unregulated' products and services, and sell these
services back to the utility. A prime example is the billing, collection,
and data processing corporations now being set up by some electric utilities to sell such services back to the utility. ' 55 The regulator's task, of

course, is to make sure that the utility buys back those services at a
'1 See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 30, at 8-9 (unavoidable "slack" resources
should be shared with affiliates and priced at market prices); Herzog & Lipman, Utility

Asset Use in Nonutility Lines of Business and the Revenue Allocation Problem, PUB.

UTIL. FORT., Aug. 6, 1987, at 9, 10 ("use of existing utility assets to produce ancillary
nonutility services permits a diversified utility . . . to produce unregulated services and
products at lower incremental cost than those services would require if produced with
separate assets").
50 See Friedlein, Finger & DeLaney, supra note 46, at 16.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 17.

53 See id.
See id.

11 Letter from Michael M. Tischer, Deputy Attorney General, State of Delaware,
to Jeffrey Knapp (Nov. 10, 1987) (copy on file at the University of PennsylvaniaLaw

Review).
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reasonable price.
(iii) Capitalization of a Nonregulated Venture
There is some question whether the practices falling under this
heading actually represent a subsidy. The underlying concern is that
the start-up funds for the unregulated activity will come from the ratepayers, but any profits from that activity will be enjoyed exclusively by
shareholders.5 6 The degree of concern one expresses for this particular
subsidy depends in large part on one's view of the relative stakes of
shareholders and ratepayers in the utility. The majority view seems to
be that the "utility is allowed to make a certain return on its franchise
business. . . . Normally, a company returns 60 to 70 percent of its
earnings to its common stockholders, to keep them happy. What the
company does with [the remaining] 25 to 30 percent is more or less
' Proponents of this
their own business." 57
view contend that denying the
ratepayer any benefit from the profits realized by the diversified activity is not a subsidy because the ratepayer has no claim to the funds
invested to produce those profits.
Consumer advocates adamantly oppose this view of the utility's
obligation. One consumer advocate claims that the only reason utilities
can even think about diversification is because they " 'are sitting on
11 See 1982 NARUC REPORT, supra note 16, at 18 ("If funds are provided
through the utility, especially if provided by the ratepayers, ratepayers may want a
share of the diversified earnings."); Friedlein, Finger & Delaney, supra note 46, at 18
(same).
'7 Friedlein, Finger & DeLaney, supra note 46, at 19 (quoting Joe Smith, Director of Finance, Statistics, and Planning for the North Carolina Utilities Commission);
see also 1983 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 309 (statement of Stanley York,
Chairman of 1982 NARUC Ad Hoc Committee on Utility Diversification) ("[The retained earnings] don't belong to the ratepayer. They have already in a sense been paid
to the stockholder, and the stockholder has said, 'Instead of paying me cash for what
you owe me, hang onto some of it and [re-invest it].' "); Shaw, supra note 14, at 52526 ("If cash which would otherwise be used to pay dividends is used to finance equity
in new businesses, then the utility customers have . . . no claim on the returns from
those businesses. . . . Once the return is earned, management can decide how to use it
in the stockholders' interest."). Of course, depending on the degree of its statutory authority, a PSC might still try to prevent a utility from diversifying into extraordinarily
risky ventures. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court spoke on this issue in the context of telephone utilities in Bd.
of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23 (1926). The Court stated:
The customers are entitled to demand service and the company must comply. The company is entitled to just compensation and, to have the service,
the customers must pay for it. . . . Customers pay for service, not for the
property used to render it. . . . By paying bills for service, they do not
acquire any interest, legal or equitable, in the property used for their convenience or in the funds of the company.
Id. at 31-32.
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piles of cash that they got because they milked us' to pay for new
plants.""8 The argument is that funds that currently appear to be unnecessary for the construction of new plants should be returned to
ratepayers.
Similarly, although most regulators adopt the view that investment
of retained earnings is the company's business, the vote is not unanimous. In a rate case involving the Duke Power Company, North Carolina Commissioner Leigh Hammond, an economist, dissented from the
commission's decision to grant an electric utility's request to invest in a
uranium venture.5 9 A provision in the plan approved by the commission permitted the utility to charge off to electric operating expense any
exploration expenses that were not successful."' In other words, the
ratepayers in this case did far more than provide start-up capital; they
effectively agreed to guarantee the entire venture."1 Commissioner
Hammond urged that the majority's approval of the plan "takes the
commission another step in the direction of forcing the customers of
public utilities to assume risks and provide financing for activities that
should be pursued by nonutility business firms, and supported by the
venture capital market."62
Capitalization of an unregulated subsidiary amounts to an impermissible subsidy under nearly every view of "ownership" if utility management, at the behest of the dominant holding company, authorizes
dividends so excessive as to jeopardize the capital position of the utility.63 It may be that "the important variable is the net capital flow to
the utility. '64 One would expect the holding company to require some
return on its investment in the utility. At the same time, "the utility
must have access to a sufficient flow of equity capital, either from equity contributions [from the parent] or retained earnings, to achieve a
desireable [sic] balance between debt and equity financing." 6
Regardless of how one views the ownership stake in the utility, it
is clearly possible for utility ratepayers t6 suffer when utility management invests large amounts of retained earnings in nonutility ventures.
18 Paul, supra note 2, at 6, col. 2 (quoting Sylvia Siegel, Exec. Dir., Toward
Utility Rate Normalization).
11 See Friedlein, Finger & DeLaney, supra note 46, at 19.
60 See id.
"1 In the words of Commissioner Hammond, "This is a clever mechanism to provide a 'guarantee against loss' for a high risk non-utility subsidiary." Id.
62

Id.

11 In the normal situation, the holding company owns close to 100% of the utility's
stock. See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 30, at 13. Thus, dividends represent a direct
cash infusion into the holding company from the utility.
6 Id. at 14.
65 Id.
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If the nonutility venture is successful, there is a temptation to neglect
the utility in pursuit of higher returns elsewhere. Sudden increases in
demand may leave ratepayers either without power or subject to curtailments. If the nonutility ventures fail and capital ratios decline, then
customers are likely to face higher rates as a result of higher capital
costs in the utility. 66
Whether these effects are labeled "subsidies" or something else,
the need for ratepayer protection is apparent.
(iv) Below-Market Pricing
While the three categories of cross-subsidization discussed above
have their primary impact on the ratepayers of the utility, this last example primarily affects established businesses in unregulated fields that
now face a daunting new competitor in the utility."I "When a utility
company uses its capital assets, retained earnings, market credit, or
sheer size to help it underprice the competition, it is engaging in 'below-market pricing.' "68 In North Carolina, a utility propane operation
was in competition with approximately 200 small propane businesses
within the state. The utility commission said, "If a utility engages in a
nonutility operation and hurts another business, that operation is not in
our jurisdiction."6 9 The concern is that "[i]f the utility is allowed to
transfer any of its financial strength or stature to a non-regulated but
related business operation, . . . a publicly licensed monopoly is being

allowed to compete with special advantage or to pass on that advantage
to a related firm through a holding company structure."' Business
people in unregulated markets are especially wary because utility-related competitors might be able to use the utility's "access to every single house, factory, [and] commercial building [to their] massive [marketing] advantage."7 1 Whether this particular abuse is classified as an
anti-trust problem or a cross-subsidization problem, it seems clear that
66 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text; see also York, Dube, & Malko,
supra note 31, at 588 ("[Tjhe bond rating of the utility may be impaired as a result of
bad experiences with nonutility businesses.").
67 See Kahn, supra note 18, at 152 ("[T]he diversifying company itself may, by
virtue of its regulated monopoly operations, be in a position to compete unfairly in the
unregulated areas with independent businesses that enjoy no such affiliation.").
68 Friedlein, Finger & DeLaney, supra note 46, at 20.

69

Id. at 21.

1983 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 400 (statement from National Electrical Contractors Association); see also Friedlein, Finger & DeLaney, supra note 46, at
21 ("[A] utility may have a willingness to live with very low profits in the nonregulated
area in the short term in order to use one monopoly . . . to create another.").
70

"' 1983 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 402 (statement of Mr. Patrick C.
O'Connor, Public Affairs Counsel, American Supply Ass'n).
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an effective statute designed to regulate diversification should address
the issue.
b.

"Milking" the Utility

In addition to the "cross-subsidization" problems discussed above,
there are other ways for a holding company to treat the utility subsidiary as a cash cow. For example, the holding company could arrange
low-interest or no-interest loans from the utility to its unregulated subsidiaries. Indeed, some regulators argue that any long term loan from a
utility to a parent should be treated as a direct reduction in utility equity.72 Since the cost of utility debt tends to be lower than the cost of
equity, the net effect is a decrease in the allowed rate of return for the
utility and a reduction (to some small degree) of the cost to
ratepayers.7 3
Another potential area of concern is a variation on the transfer
pricing issue discussed above, where there are ongoing transactions between the utility and unregulated subsidiaries. A similar concern arises
when the transaction involved is an isolated one, such as a purchase or
sale of property between the utility and a subsidiary. "[Ihf the . . .
utility records the transaction at original cost or net book value, this
treatment would not recognize the current market value of the property
or the possibility that the ratepayers may have been providing a return
74
on the property prior to its transfer.1
A practice that may never result in a direct cash drain to the utility, but which can involve uncompensated exploitation of a utility asset,
is having the utility guarantee the debt of a subsidiary or of the holding
company itself.75 This practice simply should not be permitted, whether
the utility is compensated for the guarantee or not, because it violates
the insulation of the utility from the risk of the unregulated business.
That insulation is one of the primary justifications for the formation of
the holding company.
A related intangible benefit, and one not susceptible to easy quanSee

FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 30, at 12.
See id. The PSC could use a hypothetical capital structure to calculate a fair
rate of return, treating the capital infusion to the subsidiary as a reduction in utility
equity and passing this on to consumers through lower rates. "By employing a higher
than actual debt ratio (a lower equity ratio), a lower computed cost of capital is ob72

73

tained because the cost of debt is generally lower than the cost of equity . . . ." K.
HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 26, at 101. A lower cost of capital means a lower

revenue requirement and, theoretically, a lower general rate level. See id. at 64-109.
74 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 30, at 10.
75 See, e.g., id. at 13 ("If the utility secures any debt on behalf of its affiliates,
then a financial failure of the affiliate can adversely affect the utility.").
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tification, is the unregulated business's ability to "trade off" the (usually) well-known name of the utility. Ratepayers should be compensated for any benefits flowing to unregulated firms by virtue of
association with the utility.76
II.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF REGULATION

In exchange for receiving permission to conduct a monopoly business enterprise, utilities subject themselves to intensive scrutiny from
governmental regulatory bodies. 7 Regulation substitutes for competition and prevents utility-monopolies from receiving "excess" economic
profits.7 1 Most federal regulation is carried out by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), which regulates rates of wholesale
gas and electricity transactions between utilities. 79 As already men-

tioned, Congress also empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate utility holding company structures through the
PUHCA.
However, the front line of rate regulation is traditionally conducted at the state level through the PSCs whose function is to ensure
that the utility does not exploit its monopoly position to overcharge captive ratepayers.8 0 Given this role, the PSCs are the logical bodies to
look to for the regulation of diversification. Indeed, the drafters of the
PUHCA expressed a preference for state regulation, and contemplated
that the PUHCA would be the first arm of a coordinated effort between federal and state authorities.8 "
7' Anyone who doubts the existence and value of
only look to the lengths and expense to which companies
from use by competitors.
7 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876)
property to a use in [the public interest, he] must submit

this "invisible" subsidy need
will go to protect their names
("when . . . one devotes his
to be controlled by the public

for the common good"); see generally C. PHILLIPS, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-31 (1984) (presenting the theory of public utility
regulation).
78 See K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 26, at 62 (PSCs' "mandate is to
ensure adequate service at minimum cost to consumers consistent with a reasonable
return to creditors and owners"); Buck & Groth, supra note 11, at 24 (regulators must
estimate returns at a level high enough that investors will risk capital while maintaining the lowest possible price to consumers).
79 See Federal Energy Regulatory Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a) (1982). Congress
originally granted this authority to the Federal Power Commission (now FERC) in
response to the limitations of effective state regulation. See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 77,
at 533-34 ("State commissions were limited in their control of electric utilities in two
specific ways: (a) by the interstate transmission of power, and (b) by development of
holding companies.").
80 See generally C. PHILLIPS, supra note 77, at 109-48 (discussing the role of
independent regulatory commissions).
81 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 79f(b), 79g(g), 79i(b), 79m(d) (1982) (sections contemplating
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Unfortunately, although the current regulatory scheme is quite detailed, it is still inadequate. The PUHCA essentially addresses its limitations on diversification to interstate holding company systems. Significantly, those holding companies that are predominately intrastate in
character fall outside the jurisdiction of PUHCA and SEC surveillance.8 2 At the same time, state regulation, when it exists, generally
relies on a seemingly broad grant of jurisdiction, which many courts
have chosen to interpret narrowly. 3 Given the current need for adequate regulation, states must engage the legislative process to protect
ratepayers' interests.
A. Federal Regulation of Diversification
Congress has been concerned with diversification and the holding
company structure since at least 1935, when the Public Utility Holding
Company Act84 was enacted. The PUHCA was enacted in response to
significant abuses in the energy utility industry, which had resulted in
extremely cumbersome, uneconomic corporate structures and a perceived potential for significant harm to ratepayers and investors.8 5 Prior
to passage, it was not at all unusual for utility holding companies to
operate subsidiaries in highly speculative industries, wholly unconjoint federal and state regulation); S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935)
("purpose of section 11 [15 U.S.C. 79k] is simply to provide a mechanism to create
condition under which effective Federal and State regulation will be possible");
Buchanan, supra note 10, at 548 (describing PUHCA as "both a supplement to state
regulation of public utilities and a further step in the program of securities regulation"); infra notes 88 & 95 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 134-83 and accompanying text.
84 Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 79-79z-(6) (1982)).
85 See 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (1982) (PUHCA was necessary for protection of investors and interests of consumers). For contemporaneous accounts of the abuses leading to
passage of the Act, see generally SECTION OF PUB. UTIL. L., A.B.A., REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REGULATION OF HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN SUCH COMPANIES AND AFFILITATED OPERATING COMPANIES 2-6

(1933) (detailing two classes of abuses); Buchanan, supra note 10, at 531 (public utility
holding companies' activities arguably injurious to the public well-being as well as to
consumers and investors); Comment, FederalRegulation of Holding Companies: The
Public Utility Act of 1935, 45 YALE L.J. 468, 468 (1936) ("deep-rooted social, economic, and legal causes contributed to [PUCHA's] enactment").
In fairness, it should be pointed out that, at least in the early years, holding companies did serve positive, perhaps essential functions. See, e.g., R. RITCHIE, supra note
33, at 10-11 (listing four advantages to the holding company structure); Lilienthal, The
Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 404 (1929)
(citing rural electrification, advances in "telephone," rise of super-power systems, and
an "unprecedented flow of capital... making possible extension and improvements of
service").
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nected to their utility operations."8 The Act sought to curb "growth and
extension of holding companies [that] bear[] no relation to economy of
management and operation or the integration and coordination of related operating properties.""7
Today, there remain only twelve holding company systems registered under the Act-nine electric and three gas.8" In contrast, there
are 103 holding companies, with 793 nonutility subsidiaries, exempt
from the PUHCA."9 The fact that the PUHCA continues to apply to
only twelve systems is taken by some as conclusive evidence that the
legislation was a success and that the PUHCA has outlived its usefulness." On the other hand, exemption from the PUHCA tends to shift
the regulatory burden from the SEC to the state PSCs.9
1. The Public Utility Holding Company Act
The Act presumptively applies to all public utility holding company systems. Unless a reprieve is granted by one of the Act's exemption provisions, holding company systems are required to register with
the SEC. 2 These registered holding companies are subject to the Act's
simplification requirements.9" To this end, Congress directed the SEC
to order the registered holding companies to limit their operations to a
"single integrated public-utility system, and to such other businesses as
are reasonably incidental, or economically necessary or appropriate to
the operation of. . . [the] system."94 The intent of the Act was to facil88

See R.

RITCHIE,

supra note 33, at 14.

" 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b)(4) (1982).
88 See OFFICE OF PUB. UTIL. REGULATION, Div. OF INV. MANAGEMENT, SEC,
FINANCIAL AND

CORPORATE

COMPANY SYSTEMS

REPORT:

REGISTERED

PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING

1 (March 31, 1986). The registered electric systems account for

some 20% of the operating revenues of all electric utilities in the United States. See id.
s9 See OFFICE OF PUB. UTIL. REGULATION, DIv. OF INV. MANAGEMENT,
FINANCIAL AND

CORPORATE REPORT: HOLDING COMPANIES

SEC,

EXEMPT FROM THE

1935 UNDER SECTION 3(a)(1) AND
3(a)(2) PURSUANT TO RULE 2 FILINGS OR BY ORDER 44-48 (Aug. 31, 1987); infra
PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF

notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussion of exemptions under the Act).
90 See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 7, at 28, col. 1 (Many believe "that the [SEC]
had long ago completed the principal task thrust upon it in 1935 when it completed the
restructuring of the industry, and that developments since 1935-economic, legal, and
regulatory-had rendered needless or duplicative the remaining activities of the commission under the act.").
91 See infra notes 101-05 & 107-33 and accompanying text.
92 See 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7) (1982) ("'[h]olding company' means any company
which directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 10 per centum
or more of the outstanding voting securities of a public-utility company") (emphasis
added).
13 See id. § 79k (1982).
9- Id. § 79k(b)(1) (1982). The holding company was permitted to retain any subsidiaries for which it could show that affiliation with the holding company promoted
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itate state regulation95 and to compel utilities to stay close to their fields
of expertise."'
In determining what other businesses could be retained (or initiated) by registered holding companies, the SEC formulated a "functionally related" test.17 Naturally, the SEC's view of functional relation
changes over time, but some examples of activities found not to satisfy
the test in the past include housing construction, land development,
electrical instruments, pulpwood, and cable television. 8 In other words,
the diversification potential for registered companies is strictly circumscribed by the PUHCA.99 Because the SEC must give prior approval
before the registered systems can make any acquisition, and the acquired business must be "functionally related," state regulators are relieved of the duty of watching those systems as carefully as they watch
exempt holding companies or utilities that diversify without using the
holding company structure.
It comes as no surprise that Congress chose to make interstate
companies the focus of the federal legislation. 0 0 The PUHCA provides
for exemptions1 0 ' for those companies which, in Congress's judgment,
were structured so as not to give rise to the sorts of abuses the PUHCA
"substantial economies," or which were located in contiguous states, or where continued affiliation did not hamper effective regulation or "advantages of localized management." Id. at § 79k(b)(1)(A)-(C).
" See id. § 79a(b)(3) (1982); see also North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686,
704 n.14 (1946) (quoting S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935)).
11 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935) ("single system.
not mixed up with any extraneous businesses such as real estate, hotels, and operations
in foreign countries"); id. at 12 ("The argument of diversification of risk is an attempt
to justify as a matter of economic principle, the accumulation of unrelated operating
properties in a completely accidental way for immediate reasons of financial
opportunism.").
"'See Hawes, Utility Diversification, 14 REV. OF SEC. REG. 949, 950 (March 19,
1981). In effect, the functionally related test has two parts, both of which must be
satisfied: the other business must be functionally related as well as in the public interest. See D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 3.05[1], at 3-30; Hawes, supra, at 950.
98 See D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 3.05[1], at 3-30.
" In fact, frustration born of watching exempt holding companies and independent utilities diversify seemingly at will over the past several years was part of the
impetus for the movement to amend substantially or repeal outright the PUHCA in
1981, 1982 and 1983. See 1983 House Hearings,supra.note 16, at 162-65 (testimony
of Guy Nichols, on behalf of registered utility group); Sommer, supra note 7, at 28,
cols. 2-3; see also Sommer, supra note 22, at 539 ("inherent inequity" in differing
treatment of exempt companies, registered companies, and diversified companies not
organized as holding companies-"customers and investors of each deserve the same
protections").
100 See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 77, at 533 ("[s]ince the largest holding company
systems were interstate, they were not within the state commissions' jurisdiction").
10 "Exempt" companies are still subject to limitations on acquisition of utility
securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 79i (1982); D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 3.04[1], at 3-10
n.k. The exemption criteria are found in section 3 of the PUHCA. One commentator
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was meant to address. The exemptions fall into three principal categories:10 2 (1) when the holding company, and every public utility subsidiary thereof, is predominantly intrastate in character and organized in
the same state;10 3 (2) when the holding company is itself an operating
public utility, and its operation is confined to the state of organization
and contiguous states;104 and (3) when the holding company is only
incidentally a holding company, derives a material part of its income
from a public utility subsidiary, is only temporarily a holding company,
or is a holding company only with respect to foreign public utilities. 0 5
2.

The Degree of Reliance on State Authorities

The SEC is directed to grant an exemption to any holding company meeting the section 3 criteria "unless and except insofar as it
finds the exemption detrimental to the public interest or the interest of
investors or consumers. 10 6 The proper interpretation of the "unless
and except" clause remains a point of contention to this day.
"Prior to 1971, holding companies that were exempt under the
[PUHCA] generally believed that they were free to operate in any'
manner so long as they did not disturb the characteristics that brought
them within the objective criteria for exemption."10 7 This interpretation
was not an implausible one-after all, they were exempt from the Act.
Another plausible reading of the PUHCA, however, in light of its
broad and strong statement of purpose, would forbid even exempt holding companies from diversification ventures. When two cases addressing
noted:
[Tihe [SEC] staff has encouraged electric and gas utility companies that
set up holding companies to do so through the exemption procedure provided by rule 2 [17 C.F.R. § 250.2 (1987)]. That is, companies that meet
the objective exemption criteria of section 3(a)(1) or (2) [15 U.S.C.
§ 79c(a)(1) or (2) (1982)] need not apply for a Commission order to obtain an exemption, but may simply file a form ... on becoming a holding
company and an updated form .

.

. on or before March 1 of each year

thereafter.. . . One reason the staff has encouraged this procedure is that
it avoids the necessity of the SEC's specifically endorsing any type or degree of diversification.
Hawes, supra note 97, at 952.
102 This description of the Act is taken from Hawes, Public Utility Holding Com-

pany Act of 1935-Fossil or Foil?, 30 VAND. L. REv. 605, 612 (1977).
103 See id. (citing PUHCA § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(1) (1970)).
104 See id. (citing PUHCA § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(2) (1970)).
103 See id. (citing PUHCA §§ 3(a)(3)-(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79c(a)(3)-(5) (1970)).
106
15 U.S.C. § 79c (1982).
107D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 3.0511], at 3-34 to -35. For a comprehensive
analysis of the four types of exemptions available under the Act, see id., § 3.04[1], at
3-9-3-18.
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this issue were decided by the SEC on the same day in 1971, neither of
these interpretations was able to command a majority.
The first case, In re Pacific Lighting,"'8 involved a gas public utility holding company system that had been exempt by a SEC order
since 1936.109 In 1936, the SEC had found that Pacific Lighting came
under the section 3(a)(1) exemption as being predominantly intrastate
and concluded that there was no basis for requiring registration under
the "unless and except" clause.110 In this latter proceeding, the SEC's
Division of Corporate Regulation urged "that the exemption be modified so as to require Pacific to dispose of those of its non-utility interests not functionally related to its gas distribution business.""' The
SEC described Pacific's diversified subsidiaries as follows:
1. four subsidiaries that the company classified as "utility-related"
whose primary purpose was to promote the use of gas through loans to
contractors and equipment leasing;.. 2 and
2. six businesses concededly unrelated to the utility business engaged in real estate development and agriculture.11 3
As of December 31, 1970, non-utility investments, including guarantees
114
of subsidiary debt, constituted 14% of the holding company's assets.
The Division of Corporate Regulation argued that the "unless and
except" clause restricts diversification by exempt holding companies to
the same extent that section 11(b)(1) of the Act limits diversification by
registered systems, i.e., to functionally related activities that are in the
public interest.'
Two commission members, Casey and Loomis, re45 S.E.C. 152 (1973).
See id. at 152.
0oSee id. at 153.

109
110

111

Id.

The broad aim of these subsidiaries was to promote the use of natural gas.
Two subsidiaries "were organized to construct and operate central gas-fired heating
and cooling plants." Id. at 154. A third subsidiary "was formed to guarantee loans to
builders and developers using gas air-conditioning," but had expanded its scope to include general construction financing without regard to the use of gas. Id. A fourth
subsidiary was organized "to distribute a conversion kit which permits motor vehicles to
operate on compressed natural gas interchangeably with gasoline." Id.
113 The real estate subsidiaries acquired underdeveloped land, developed it for
commercial or industrial use, and sold or leased completed projects that were located
primarily in California and Hawaii. See id. at 155. One agricultural subsidiary was
engaged in "farming, packing, and marketing of citrus fruits and pistachio nuts in California." Id. The other agricultural subsidiary was formed to acquire 28 existing entities operating in six or seven states, engaged in the business of fruit farming, packing,
and marketing. See id. at 156. The company justified the functionally unrelated acquisitions as compelled by the stagnant demand for gas service, saturation of the service
area, uncertainty of gas supplies, and declining earnings. See id. at 154.
114 See id. at 156. This figure represents significant diversification relative to the
investments of other firms. See Murray & Closterman, supra note 2, at 12.
11 See Pacific Lighting, 45 S.E.C. at 158; supra notes 97-99 and accompanying
112
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jected this "per se interpretation of the statute which would equate the
retention of an unrelated non-utility business with detriment to the
. . . interests" the PUHCA seeks to protect.11 According to Casey and
Loomis, the PUHCA was designed to treat registered and exempt holding companies differently, because "Congress did not consider there
was need for

. .

.

pervasive Federal regulations in the case of intrastate

holding companies which were already subject to effective state regulation."' 17 Also, Casey and Loomis imply, holding companies that can
meet the section 3 exemption criteria are already subject to effective
state regulation."'
Casey and Loomis did not think that diversification should be allowed to proceed completely unfettered, and they proposed several
fairly restrictive conditions on diversification through holding companies.19 The purpose of the proposed Casey and Loomis conditions was
"to insulate the utility business to the [greatest] extent possible from
being adversely affected by losses in non-utility operations and to prevent the diversion of utility resources for non-utility purposes . ..

.,,'

These guidelines are considered more carefully later in this Comment
because these are the same goals to be achieved by our model state
statute.
text (discussing the functionally related test). "The staff was of the opinion that the
prescribed [functional relation] limits. . . were so firm and pervasive in the regulatory
structure of the Act that they should be applied to exempt holding companies as well."
Levy, supra note 2, at 557.
116 Pacific Lighting, 45 S.E.C. at 158. Because the commission was evenly divided, 2-2, the status quo was maintained and Pacific Lighting retained its exemption.
See id. at 166 ("The absence of a majority position on [the exemption] issue has the
effect of permitting the existing exemption to continue.").
Id. at 159 (opinion of Chairman Casey and Commissioner Loomis).
118 See id. at 158-59.
1 Id. at 161-62. The restrictions included: (1) separation of non-utility activities
from utility activities through separate corporate subsidiaries; (2) prohibition of services
and contracts between the utility and other subsidiaries except where such contracts are
subject to the supervision of state regulatory agencies; (3) strict separation of utility
from non-utility management, credit, and funds; (4) keeping the non-utility investments
as a relatively small component of the entire system; and (5) requiring that non-utility
activities be either complementary to existing utility activities, or have an established
record of profitability. See D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 3.05[2], at 3-36.
These restrictions have become known as the Casey/Loomis guidelines and continue to exercise some influence in divining to what extent and under what conditions
the SEC will permit diversification. See id. However, the guidelines are not binding on
the present commission-which, in any event, has advocated total repeal of the
PUHCA. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 25 (statement of SEC chairman that statute
has "served its purpose" but future federal regulation is "unnecessary and inappropriate"); Brown & Bink, supra note 9, at 43 (SEC was early proponent of statute's repeal); supra notes 9 & 90 and accompanying text.
120 Pacific Lighting, 45 S.E.C. at 161 (opinion of Chairman Casey and Commissioner Loomis).
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The other two commissioners, Owens and Herlong, argued for a
much more restrictive interpretation of the PUHCA and its exemption
provisions. Owens and Herlong agreed with Casey and Loomis that
there was a difference between registered and exempt holding companies under the PUHCA, and that a per se rule was not an accurate
interpretation of the Act. 2 1 Owens and Herlong also supported the
Casey and Loomis guidelines designed to insulate utility interests. 2 2
The two opinions differ, however, in the extent to which each would
permit the utility business holding companies to diversify. For Owens
and Herlong, the test for retention of nonutility activities was less restrictive for exempt than for registered systems,123 but any such nonutility operation had to be "related" or "complementary" to the utility
business. 2 Owens and Herlong believed that acceptable diversification
included businesses tending to promote the use of the utility's product,
and even such "complementary" activities as marketing the utility's existing surplus computer billing capacity to third parties. 25 Owens and
Herlong would not have permitted Pacific Lighting to retain its exemption unless it divested itself of its agriculture, real estate, and financing
activities unrelated to promoting the use of gas.1 2 6 These two commissioners asserted that these types of businesses were
in the same category and fraught with the same danger of
injury to the public utility investor and consumer interests as
the scattered and risk-laden ventures that led to the abuses
described in Section 1(b) of the Act, the recurrence of which
[we] view the "unless and except" clause clearly directs this
Commission to prevent. 27
The commissioners split along these same lines in In re National
Utilities & Industries Corp.,1 28 an order promulgated on the same day
as Pacific Lighting. This second adjudication also involved a gas hold121

22

See id. at 165 (opinion of Commissioner Owens).
See id. (noting that Congess meant to allow for "prophylactic standards" to

avoid the "potentiality of abuse").

12 See id. ("I agree that a per se prohibition for exempt holding companies of all
non-utility activities not meeting the functional tests of retainability prescribed for registered holding companies is not warranted .... " (emphasis added)).
24 See id.
28 See id. Commissioner Herlong dissented from the portion of Commissioner
Owens' opinion that would have permitted a holding company to promote use of the
utility's product through the acquisition or retention of low-income housing, since Herlong viewed such activities as neither related nor complementary to the utility business.
See id. at 166 (opinion of Commissioner Herlong).
2" See id. at 165-66 (opinion of Commissioner Owens).
127 Id.
128

45 S.E.C. 167 (1973).
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ing company system claiming an intrastate exemption from the
PUHCA. National Utilities & Industries Corp. ("NUI") sought diversification for many of the same reasons cited by Pacific Lighting: limited prospects for expansion, a saturated service area, and uncertainty
over gas supplies.1 29 NUI retained its exemption because the nonutility
acquisitions either satisfied the Casey and Loomis guidelines or were
considered immaterial as a percentage of NUI's consolidated assets.'
Owens and Herlong argued that continued exemption should be conditioned on divestiture of all nonconforming subsidiaries regardless of
how small they were relative to the holding company."' 1 However,
since the Commission was evenly divided, NUI retained its exempt
status.
The lesson taught by these cases is that the SEC recognizes some
restrictions on diversification even by holding company systems exempt
from the PUHCA. However, the extent of those restrictions is far from
clear in light of the changed membership of the SEC, the perception of
the PUHCA as an obsolete hindrance to prudent investment decisions,' 32 and the general hostility of the Reagan administration to federal regulation restricting operation of the free market.
The PUHCA is described by some as an "emergency brake" in
the event that diversification by an exempt holding company should go
terribly wrong.' 33 Since emergency brakes are by definition reserved for
extraordinary situations, even with the existence of the PUHCA it is
critical that state PSCs set their own guidelines for diversification and
define their authority before the situation deteriorates to a point compelling SEC involvment. Various state responses to this challenge are
the subject of the next section of this Comment.
B.

State Regulation of Diversification

Surprisingly few states have directly confronted the issue of regulating diversification through holding companies. 3 4 It may be that the
129

See id. at 168-69.

130 See id. at 170-71.
131See id. at 172.
132 See supra note 119.
133 See D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 3.05[2], at 3-39 (The SEC probably would
not challenge nonutility acquisitions if they were within the Casey/Loomis guidelines,
"absent a threat to the financial integrity of the utility.").
134 The question of federal pre-emption of state regulation conveniently presents
itself as the threshold issue in a challenge undertaken against the operation of state
regulation. In light of the PUHCA's strong policy in favor of state regulation of public
utilities, see supra notes 81 & 95 and accompanying text, it would be surprising if the
Act were construed to preempt state regulation of utility holding companies. This issue
is occasionally litigated, as, for example, in Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Heintz, 760
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modest degree and moderate impact of diversification thus far has kept
the issue out of the public consciousness and off the legislative agenda.
Perhaps states have simply assumed that federal regulation of utility
holding companies is adequate. Some PSCs may rely on their broad
grants of authority as sufficient to reach unregulated activities. However, in the aftermath of recent attempts to repeal the PUHCA and the
apparent acceleration of diversification through holding companies, specific grants of statutory authority are becoming more common, 35 and
F.2d 1408 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 647 (1985).
Baltimore Gas & Elec. involved a Maryland statute regulating the acquisition of
stock in public service companies. See id. at 1413. The utility planned a reorganization
whereby the utility would become a wholly-owhed subsidiary of a holding company,
BGE Corp., in order to facilitate diversification by other nonutility subsidiaries. See id.
at 1412. The Maryland statute appeared to ban such a reorganization, and the utility
claimed the statute was pre-empted by the PUHCA. See id. The utility also alleged
that the statute violated the commerce, due process, and equal protection clauses; but
these attacks proved unsuccessful. See id. at 1427. For a discussion of these latter challenges, see The Fourth Circuit Review, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 431, 505-10 (1986).
The court made short shrift of the preemption argument, relying on the legislative
history of the PUHCA, which it said "contemplate[d] coordinate state and federal regulation." Baltimore Gas & Elec., 760 F.2d at 1415. The court asserted that the "purpose of section 11 [15 U.S.C. § 79k] is simply to provide a mechanism to create conditions under which effective Federal and State regulation will be possible." Id. (quoting
S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1945)).
The utility was reduced to arguing that Congress could have banned holding companies altogether, but since it chose to regulate rather than eliminate, Maryland was
prohibited from enacting a statute that would completely bar public utility holding
companies. See id. at 1415. The court answered this argument by asserting that "Congress' rejection of a statute that would completely outlaw public utility holding companies does not necessarily establish that public utility holding companies cannot be prohibited by the states." Id. The conclusion to be reached is that the PUHCA does not
cover the entire field of regulation of public utility holding companies. Therefore, even
though a holding company might gain an exemption under section 3 of the federal act,
that exemption does not necessarily trump a conflicting state regulatory statute.
35 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 314(b) (West Supp. 1988) (granting commission access to books and records of holding companies and subsidiaries); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 708 (1988) (requiring PSC approval of reorganization of utility, and setting conditions on approval); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-6-17 to -19 (1984
Replacement Pamphlet) (access to books, records, accounts, and documents of any public utility affiliate); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4905.05, .06 & .46 (Anderson Supp.
1987) (guaranteeing PSC access to holding company books, setting cap on investments
in nonutility subsidiaries, and limiting dividends payable by utility); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 196.795 (West Supp. 1987) (reporting requirements for holding company, restrictions on affiliate transactions, cap on diversification). For an extensive discussion of
various state statutes as well as the efforts of certain utilities to form holding companies, see D. HAWES, supra note 12, § 4.03, at 4-16 to -63.
These statutes can be an effective means of protecting ratepayers from potentially
risky diversification. One of the first states to pass protective legislation was New Mexico, granting the PSC the authority to investigate transactions by public utilities involving holding companies. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-19 (1984 Replacement Pamphlet). Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the PSC's authority to deny
permission to form a holding company. Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. New Mexico Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 747 P.2d 917 (1987). Pursuant to statutory authority, N.M. STAT.
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more states are studying the issue. 13 6 But as the following discussion
illustrates, many current efforts fall short of their goals.
1. Affiliated Interest Statutes
Several states have enacted "affiliated interest" statutes

3

that are

ANN. § 62-6-19(E) (1984 Replacement Pamphlet), the PSC had promulgated a rule

requiring PSC approval prior to the formation of a holding company. PublicServ. Co.,
747 P.2d at 919-20 (citing General Order 39, Section 3.1(A)). The court concluded
that the power to require prior approval of holding company formation was consistent
with, and authorized by, the statute. See id. at 920, 921.
136 For example, the Delaware PSC is presently drafting legislation for introduction in the 1988 legislative session. See Letter from Michael M. Tischer, Deputy Attorney General, State of Delaware, to Jeffrey Knapp (Nov. 10, 1987) (on file at the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review). From January, 1985 until March, 1986, the
Florida PSC researched the extent and conduct of diversification in the state. See In re
Electric Util. Diversification, Docket No. 85-0096-EI, Order No. 155885, at I (Fla.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n March 24, 1986) (Order Closing Docket). Although the PSC ultimately declined to formulate specific policy, and decided to proceed on a case-by-case
basis, clearly diversification is a concern of some importance. See id. Recently, the Connecticut PSC introduced two diversification-related bills to the Connecticut General Assembly. The first grants the PSC authority to monitor financial transactions between a
utility and its holding company. See Raised Comm. Bill No. 14, LCO No. 204, Conn.
Gen. Assembly, Feb. Sess., 1988. The second gives the PSC authority to prevent crosssubsidization between regulated and unregulated entities. See id.
I" An affiliated interest statute extends public service commission jurisdiction to
entities transacting business with utilities where there is some reason to believe that the
dealings might not be at "arms-length." For example, a Kansas statute gives the PSC
jurisdiction
over affiliated interests having transactions, other than ownership of stock
and receipt of dividends thereon, with utility corporations . . . to the extent of access to all accounts and records of such affiliated interests relating
to such transactions . . . . "[A]ffiliated interests" include the following:
(a) Every corporation and person owning . . . directly or indirectly [10%]
or more of the voting capital stock of [the] utility corporation.
(b) Every corporation and person in any chain of successive ownership of
[10%] or more of voting capital stock.
(c) Every corporation [10%] or more of whose . . . stock is owned by any
person or corporation owning [10%] or more of the . . . stock of [the]
utility corporation or by any person or corporation in [a] chain of successive ownership. ...
(d) Every . . . officer or director of [the] utility .
(e) Every corporation which has one or more officers or . . . directors in
common with [the] utility . ...
(f) Every corporation . . . actually exercising any substantial influence
over the policies and actions of [the] utility.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-1401(2)(a)-(f
(1985). The statute also requires "foreign"
holding companies to agree to keep the PSC "fully informed as to the transactions
between the . . . local . . . unit and the holding company." Id. at § 66-1401(2)(g).
Other states with statutes of this type include Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-2/3,
7-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)), Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 707
(1988)), New York (N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1988)),
Pennsylvania (66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-2107 (Purdon 1979 & Supp.
1987)), and Texas (TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c §§ 3i & 67 (Vernon 1980
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used to monitor transactions between a utility and its unregulated affiliates. Affiliated interest statutes can be potent tools for PSCs, but their
scope is limited unless they also guarantee PSC access to holding company books.13 Another problem with relying solely on affiliated interest statutes is that the PSC "cannot make a definitive determination of
costs without full examination of [all] diversified subsidiaries [including
those] which do not do business with the utility and hence are not subject to the affiliated interest statute."' 39
The Illinois Commerce Commission discovered the limits of its affiliated interest statute in its five years of litigation over the reorganization of Peoples Energy Corporation. 4" Peoples, a holding company
with two public utility subsidiaries and various energy related nonpublic utility subsidiaries,' 4 ' wanted to reorganize so that an intermediate
holding company, MidCon, would own all the non-utility subsidiaries
and Peoples would own the two utility subsidiaries as well as MidCon.'4 2 The Commission ordered Peoples to show that the reorganization either "was not subject to Commission jurisdiction, or, if it was,
why [it] would be in the public interest. ' 143 After protracted procedural
tangling, the trial court granted Peoples' motion for a permanent injunction, declaring that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the
reorganization." 4
On appeal, the appellate court determined that the Commission's
jurisdiction hinged on whether Peoples was a "public utility" within
the meaning of the Illinois statute granting powers to the Commission. 45 The Commission argued that Peoples was subject to its juris& Supp. 1988)). This list is representative, but not exhaustive.
1"8 See 1982 NARUC REPORT, supra note 16, at 15 ("Current regulatory authority over utility diversification stems from existing statutory powers such as affiliated
interest statutes. However, regulators should assess their need for additional authority
... [such as] sufficient access to the books, records, and officers of non-utility
operations.").
'39 WISCONSIN REPORT, supra note 35. Regulators recognize the potential shortcomings of affiliated interest statutes and frequently try to convince the utility to agree
to more stringent conditions than those expressly authorized by statute. See infra note
152 and accompanying text.
140 See Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 142 Ill. App. 3d 917,
492 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). For an analysis of an earlier incarnation of this
case, see Note, Jurisdiction of State Regulatory Commissions Over Public Utility Diversification, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 87, 100-04 (1983).
141 See Peoples Energy, 142 I1. App. 3d at 921, 492 N.E.2d at 555.
P' See id. at 921, 492 N.E.2d at 556. While the motivation for this reorganization
is not clear from the case, there are indications that utility ratepayers had little to gain
from Peoples' action. See id. at 934-35, 935 n.2, 492 N.E.2d at 565 & n.2.
143 Id. at 921, 492 N.E.2d at 556.
144See id. at 923, 492 N.E.2d at 557.
145 See id. The statute in question was repealed and re-enacted between the beginning of the litigation and the disposition of this case. The text of the sections perti-
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diction because it was "indirectly" operating a utility. 4 6 The court,
however, concluded that Peoples could not be considered a "public utility" because Peoples itself did not operate and manage the utility. 4"
The fact that the holding company owned 100% of the utilities' common stock and "exercised substantial business control over the operating utilities" did not destroy this separate corporate identity so as to
make the holding company a de facto public utility. 4 8 The court
reached this conclusion by crediting the testimony of managers of the
utilities who testified as to their independence from the holding company in day-to-day operations.' 49 It is not clear, however, that the court
asked the right question. Autonomy in routine operations is to be expected; the abuses frequently arise when the policy that will guide dayto-day operations is being set. That policy must be approved, even if
only tacitly, at the holding company level. 5
Having lost that argument, the Commission turned to the affiliated interest statute.' 5' The court turned this provision against the
Commission, however, by pointing out that the Commission had historically treated Peoples as an affiliated interest of the utilities and consequently acknowledged a lack of jurisdiction over Peoples, and, further,
that Peoples was not a public utility. 5 2 Since it was undisputed that
the newly organized subsidiary was not a public utility, and Peoples
was not a public utility, the affiliated interest statute, which governed
transactions between a utility and its affiliate could not apply.' 5 3 In this
nent to this case did not change, but the numbering did. The court used the old numbering system. See id. at 923 n.1, 492 N.E.2d at 557 n.1.
148 See id. at 924, 492 N.E.2d at 557. The statute defined a public utility as
"every corporation . . . that owns, controls, operates or manages . . . directly or indirectly, for public use, any plant . . . used . . . for . . . (c) the production . . . or
furnishing of. . . electricity . . . [or] (e) the conveyance of oil or gas by pipeline." ILL.
2
REV. STAT. ch. 111- /3,
10.3 (1981) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111- 2/3,
1 3-105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)).
',
See id. at 926, 492 N.E.2d at 559.
148

See id. at 925, 492 N.E.2d at 558.

See id. at 925-26, 492 N.E.2d at 558-59.
For example, the president of the utilities (prior to the reorganization) testified
that "he made the ultimate decision as to the terms of any contract, and the contracts
negotiated by the management of the operating utilities did not require [the holding
company's] approval." Id. at 926, 492 N.E.2d at 559. It strains credulity to think that
utility contracts affecting the holding company were not reviewed by holding company
management, and it is hard to believe that anything like arms-length bargaining between independent firms was occurring. However, by focusing on operating (rather
than strategic) decisions, the court was able to avoid saying that the holding company
was "operating" a public utility within the meaning of the statute.
"I See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111- 2/3, T 8a (1981) (current version at ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111-2,, 1 7-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)).
152 See Peoples Energy, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 928, 492 N.E.2d at 560-61.
15 See id. at 929-30, 492 N.E.2d at 561.
149

160
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way, a public utility affiliate consummated a major restructuring of its
15
operations, and the citizens of Illinois had no voice in the matter.
2.

Broad Jurisdictional Grants

Many states simply rely on broad, vague grants of general jurisdiction over utilities to regulate the holding company structure.1 55 The
difficulty, however, is that facially broad grants of authority to regulate
" It appears that the Illinois legislature was not satisfied with the path this case
took through the court system. The legislature passed a statute that, effective January
1, 1986, gave the Commerce Commission jurisdiction over all reorganizations, including
"any transaction which, regardless of the means by which it is accomplished, will have
the effect of terminating the affiliated interest status of any entity [defined in the affiliated interest statute]." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111- 2A, T 7-204 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987).
155 See, e.g., In re Elec. Util. Diversification, No. 850096-EI, Order No. 15885,
at 2 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n) (Order Closing Docket) ("While we have no specific
statutory authority addressing diversification, we have the ability to review transactions
between affiliated companies . . . [to exclude from] rates those expenses we deem unreasonable . . . [and] establish reasonable rates of return . . . . [W]e presently have
sufficient authority . . . to address the issue of diversification."); Letter from Robert
Reiger, General Counsel, Louisiana PSC, to Jeffrey Knapp (Nov. 18, 1987) (copy on
file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) ("At the present time there doesn't
appear to be a need for specific legislation in this area. In Louisiana the LPSC is a
constitutional agency and has historically exercised its broad grant of authority through
the issuance of orders and rules.").
Other state PSCs view their grant of statutory authority more narrowly, or worse,
are limited by narrow judicial interpretations. For example, the Maryland PSC has
understood from its inception that it has no authority to prohibit utility diversification,
unless the PSC finds that the diversified undertakings are likely to impair the utility's
ability to render service. See Letter from Shirley Bigley, Director, Consumer Assistance
and Public Affairs, Maryland PSC, to Jeffrey Knapp (Nov. 17, 1987) (copy on file at
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Of course, the Maryland PSC may be
less concerned than other states about the perils of diversification because of its strong
statutory prohibition against the formation of utility holding companies. See Baltimore
Gas & Elec. v. Heintz, 760 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985).
Disputes over PSC authority, at least in this context, are litigated infrequently. In
most cases, it appears that the parties are able to reach an accommodation that normally entails a granting of permission to diversify so long as the diversifying utility
agrees to certain conditions. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, REPORT ON SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY'S REQUEST FOR COMMISSION AUTHORIZATION

2-1 to 2-10 (Aug. 25, 1987) (nonstatutory conditions on formation of holding company); Application of Honolulu Gas Co.,
No. 1861, Order No. 2762 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm'n, May 27, 1971) (reprinted in
1982 NARUC REPORT, supra note 16, at 83) (same); Application by Sierra Pacific
Power Company, No. 83-1226 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n May 14, 1984) (Comm'r
Schmidt, dissenting) (access to records, oversight of affiliate transactions); Investigation
of Corporate Reorganization of Virginia Elec. and Power Co., No. PUE 830060, at 9
(Va. State Corp. Comm'n June 30, 1986) (restrictions on composition of boards of
directors and oversight of affiliate transactions).
When the sides are very far apart, usually one will reconsider. See, e.g. San Diego
G&E Says It's Reconsidering Plan for Holding Company, Wall St. J., March 31,
1986, at 3, col. 5 (company balked at conditions), or they might end up in court. See
infra notes 165-85 and accompanying text.
TO IMPLEMENT ITS PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
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a utility might not extend to a holding company or affiliates. The Iowa
State Utilities Board is presently engaged in a dispute over this issue. 56
Iowa Power is a utility that is wholly owned by Iowa Resources."5 ' The Iowa Consumer Advocate asked to see the minutes of
certain board meetings of Iowa Resources, and Iowa Resources resisted.1" 8 The critical aspect of this case is that the Consumer Advocate's authority is assumed to be co-extensive with that of the Board. 5 9
Therefore, if the Consumer Advocate cannot gain access to the books
and records of the unregulated affiliate (Iowa Resources), then neither
can the Board. 6" It is also significant that the Consumer Advocate is
requesting access to affiliate records concerning a transaction that might
not even involve the regulated entity. 6 '
Relying on a rather obscure precedent, the Board found that the
Consumer Advocate has sufficient authority to access the records.' 62
The company appealed the decision to the Polk County District Court,
where the matter is pending.'
The right to access hardly seems as
clear as the Board suggests, given that the language of the statute imposes reporting requirements on public utilities engaged directly or indirectly in nonutility activities, not on holding companies.'" This seemSee Iowa Power and Light Co., No. M-205 (Iowa Dep't of Commerce June 3,
1987) (appeal filed).
1'

1 See id. at 1.

"' See id. "The Consumer Advocate. . .is an essential element in the system established to regulate public utilities in Iowa." Id. at 2. The role of a consumer advocate
is to offset the lobbying power of the utility before the PSC and to represent the interests of consumers. See K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 26, at 57-59.
19 See Iowa Power, No. M-205, at 2.
160 The Board may have had a vested interest in deciding this case in favor of
disclosure.
161 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
162 See Iowa Power, No. M-205, at 5. The Board's holding relied upon an unpublished Polk County District Court opinion from 1983:
• . .it is not unreasonable for the Commission to require utilities to file
information concerning affiliated companies which are a part of the same
corporate structure. This is clearly an exercise of authority over a public
utility that is within the investigatory powers granted to the Commission. . . . The information required may be used by the Commission in
the determination of the rates that may be collected by public utilities.
This is all that is required to demonstrate the relevance of the information
in question.
Id. (citing Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm., No. AA-127
(Polk County Dist. Ct. Feb. 3, 1983)). The court seemed to confuse the issue of relevance with that of authority-even relevant information is off-limits to a PSC without
jurisdiction. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 746 P.2d 4, 9-10
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (review granted Dec. 15, 1987).
161 See Letter from Susan Allender, General Counsel, Iowa State Utilities Board,
to Jeffrey Knapp (Nov. 23, 1987) (copy on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
164 See IOWA CODE § 476.9 (1986).
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ingly insignificant distinction can make a critical difference if a court is
not receptive to expansive governmental regulation of private
enterprises.
In Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Commission,"'5 the
court's interpretation of the PSC's power was narrower than the PSC's
interpretation. In that case, the utility announced its intention to reorganize, and the PSC prohibited implementation of the reorganization
pending an investigation as to whether it would have subject matter
jurisdiction over the holding company. 66 The PSC claimed implied
power to enjoin the reorganization under its legislative grant of "full
power of supervision, regulation, and control. '1 6 7 The Montana Supreme Court held that the order enjoining the reorganization was judicial in nature, and accordingly was ultra vires as to the PSC.168 The
three dissenting justices each pointed out that if the PSC lacked jurisdiction over the holding company, the only meaningful opportunity to
investigate the reorganization would be prior to formation. 6 This case
underscores the need for more specific grants of statutory authority to
agencies charged with regulating diversifying utilities. 7
206 Mont. 359, 671 P.2d 604 (1983).
See id. at 362-63, 671 P.2d at 606-07.
167 Id. at 372, 671 P.2d at 611 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-102 (1987)).
168 See id. at 377-78, 671 P.2d at 614.
189 See id. at 381, 671 P.2d at 616 (Morrison, J., dissenting); id. at 386, 671 P.2d
at 618 (Keedy, J., dissenting); id. at 388-89, 671 P.2d at 619-20 (Shea, J., dissenting).
This consideration apparently was a factor in Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. New Mexico
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 747 P.2d 917 (1987), discussed supra note 135. Interpreting the
statute giving the PSC jurisdiction over public utility holding companies, the court rejected an interpretation that failed to give the PSC the power of prior approval of
holding company formation. Such an interpretation, said the court, "would strip the
[PSC] of its ability to protect ratepayers from the adverse effects of the holding company restructuring until the impact has occured. This Court must interpret statutes in
a way which will not render their application unreasonable nor defeat the intended
objective of the legislation." Id. at 920 (citation ommitted).
...Even where the court ostensibly sides with the PSC, there is no guarantee that
ratepayers will receive adequate protection. For example, in Utah Dep't of Admin.
Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), the PSC reached an agreement with a utility permitting the transfer of utility assets to an unregulated subsidiary
despite protests from groups appearing on behalf of ratepayers. See id. at 604. In that
case, a gas utility transferred its oil exploration and production properties to an unregulated subsidiary, prompting claims from the Division of Public Utilities that the utility
assets had been financed by the ratepayers and should not now be employed for the sole
benefit of the shareholders. See id. The PSC approved the transfer retroactively, believing that the properties, once transferred, were beyond its jurisdiction. See id. The Utah
Supreme Court disagreed, remanding the case to the PSC with the mandate that utility
customers share fairly in the transfer of assets. See Committee of Consumer Serv. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 595 P.2d 871, 878 (Utah 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014
(1980).
On remand, the Division of Public Utilities negotiated a settlement with the utility
rather than engaging in a de novo factual inquiry. See id. at 878 (specifying criteria by
165

168
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A dispute over the extent of a PSC's implied powers in the context
of a holding company system is also ongoing in Arizona. 17 ' Acting pursuant to what it perceived to be a broad grant of authority to regulate
public utilities, 172 the Arizona Corporation Commission imposed certain reporting requirements 173 on the newly formed holding company
over Arizona Public Service, the largest utility in the state.' 4 If ever
which the PSC, on remand, "must reassess the transfer and determine whether the
properties were utility assets"). The Department of Administrative Services, a major
user of the utility's natural gas service, challenged the settlement as violative of the
court's remand order and contrary to the interests of ratepayers. See Utah Dep't of
Admin. Servs., 658 P.2d at 604, 612-13. The court adopted a deferential standard of
review in evaluating whether the settlement was in the ratepayers' interest, stating that
it would "set [the PSC's] decision aside only if it is outside 'the tolerable limits of
reason' or 'so unreasonable that it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.'" Id. at
612 (citations omitted). The court endorsed the PSC's decision to resolve the dispute
without recourse to a judicial forum, and applauded the PSC's "deviation" from the
court's mandate. See id. at 613-15. The PSC held eight days of hearings to debate the
merits of the settlement, and this ventilation of the issues influenced the court's decision
to uphold the agreement. See id. at 615.
The agreement appeared to protect the immediate economic interests of ratepayers,
see id. at 616, but the Department of Administrative Services was troubled by "unlawful terms that divest the [PSC] of its jurisdiction over the . . .activities of [the nonutility] affiliates . . . ." Id. at 617. These terms included a stipulation that none of the
parties would "'claim that the properties owned by [the unregulated subsidiary] are
subject to the public utility regulation of any state.'" Id. The PSC thought it retained
it's right to intervene if the nonutility operations threatened the provision of utility
service, see id., and the court found "no error" in the PSC's reading of the agreement.
See id. However, the court never reached the issue of PSC jurisdiction over nonutility
subsidiaries with fewer direct links to the utility than the subsidiary in this case. See id.
at 621 n.33 ("[T]he extent to which a wholly owned subsidiary engaged exclusively in
exploration and development could lawfully be subject to [PSC] regulatory authority
. . . remain[s] for resolution in future proceedings.").
It is important to note that this case did not involve a holding company structure.
The nonutility subsidiary involved was a subsidiary of the utility, making the jurisdictional question simpler than it would have been in the holding company context. What
seemed to be a strong statement in support of the PSC's authority to intervene to protect ratepayers in Committee of Consumer Services ends up looking like an excuse to
exclude ratepayers from meaningful participation in the transfer of assets from the
utility in Utah Department of Administrative Services. Significantly, the opportunity
for public comment came after the agreement was ironed out by the parties. See id. at
615. After investing the effort to reach an agreement, the PSC had a vested interest in
seeing that agreement implemented. Under those circumstances, one might wonder how
seriously the PSC considered the criticisms of the opposition. The deferential standard
of review further weakened the public's voice in evaluating the agreement.
11 See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 746 P.2d 4 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987) (review granted Dec. 15, 1987).
172 See id. at 7.
173 See Corporate Restructuring of the Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., No. V-1345-85126, Decision No. 54504, at 3-9 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n April 29, 1985). These reporting requirements were primarily intended to permit the Corporation Commission to
monitor the type of intracorporate transactions that are highly susceptible to problems
of cross-subsidization.
...See Ariz. Pub. Serv., 746 P.2d at 6-7.
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there were a case for a liberal reading of a grant of authority, this
would seem to be it, because the holding company, Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, is undertaking an aggressive diversification program.
The most astonishing move to date was the acquisition of Arizona's
largest savings bank, MeraBank, for $440 million. 7 ' The Commission
prevailed in the trial court on a motion for summary judgment. 176 The
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Commission lacked
1 77
jurisdiction over the holding company.
The Commission's authority is both constitutiona 1 78 and statutory. The court, unpersuaded by the Commission's argument that the
holding company should be treated as a public service corporation by
virtue of its control over a public service corporation,' relied heavily
on the fact that the holding company itself was not a public service
corporation.' The court seemed to think that the commission could
obtain the information it needed to protect ratepayers solely through its
uncontested jurisdiction over the utility.' 2 In reaching this conclusion,
the court directly contradicted the reasoning that the Iowa Power and
Light8 3 board found so persuasive.184 Specifically, the Arizona Court
of Appeals stated that the "perceived need to obtain information from
[the holding company], however meritorious, is not a ground for finding
jurisdiction . . . under Arizona's constitutional and statutory provisions
governing public service corporations. The granting of such jurisdiction
over a non-public service holding company is a concern more properly
addressed to the state legislature."' 8 5
17 9

175 See D. HAWEs, supra note 12, § 4.03[1], at 4-18. MeraBank accounts for
nearly the same dollar amount of assets of the consolidated entity as the utility itself.

See Arizona Pub. Serv., 746 P.2d at 6 n.1.
17I

See Arizona Pub. Serv., 746 P.2d at 5.

177

See id. at 10.

'l

See ARIZ. CONST. art. 15.

REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-201 to -464 (1985).
See Arizona Pub. Serv., 746 P.2d at 8.
181 See id. at 7-8 (holding company itself "does not provide any public service
listed in the [statutory] definition").
179

See ARIZ.

180

182
18.
184

See id.

No. M-205 (Dep't of Commerce June 3, 1987).
See supra note 162.

'15 Arizona Pub. Serv., 746 P.2d at 8. In addition, the court specifically refused
to invoke the corporate law device of piercing the corporate veil because the PSC "offered no evidence of undercapitalization, fraud, misconduct, or impropriety . . . ." Id.
The court, however, failed to address the question of how the PSC could possibly offer
this sort of evidence without access to the books of the unregulated affiliates.
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Do?

A. Mapping Out the Legislative Goal
The primary goal of legislation regulating utility diversification
should be to protect the ratepayer from the risks attending the foray
into unregulated ventures. Federal securities laws ensure that investors
can obtain adequate information about a diversifying utility, allowing
them to make prudent investment decisions. Furthermore, those investors who are uncomfortable with the prospect of diversification have a
ready market for their shares.' 8 Investment information alone, however, is unlikely to help ratepayers because it is usually insufficient to
enable the PSC to make the difficult judgments necessary to prevent
cross-subsidization. Furthermore, ratepayers tend to be the "captives"
of the utility that has a monopoly within the service area. The investor,
on the other hand, can "get out" of the utility by selling her shares."8 '
Effective legislation must be multi-focused. The dynamics of diversification are such that the type of business into which a utility chooses
to diversify bears strongly on the probability of the venture's success."' 8
Provided the PUHCA survives efforts at repeal, federal regulation may
already place adequate restrictions on areas into which registered utilities may diversify.' 8 9 The restrictions on exempt holding company systems, however, are not clearly defined. 9 0° Given this uncertainty, states
will desire the authority to impose similar subject matter restrictions on
utilities within their territories.
A second concern is that the holding company structure will shield
management from inquiry into improper cross-subsidization.' 9' In order to address this concern, legislation must empower PSCs with jurisdiction over the holding company/utility system and with access to the
records of the diverse enterprises as well as the utility business.'" 2 The
perils of broad, but empty, jurisdictional grants must be avoided,' 9 3 and
188 See Sommer, supra note 7, at 28. Sommer points to many changes in the securities laws and accounting principles that offer equal or greater protection to investors than the PUHCA. See id.
187 It is conceivable that ratepayers could move to another service area with
nondiversifying utilities, or they could convert to an alternative energy source provided
by an undiversified utility. In the real world, however, neither of these expensive and
disruptive options is likely to be practical for the average ratepayer.

See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (discussing registered holding
companies under the PUHCA).
...See supra notes 106-33 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
192 See infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 155-85 and accompanying text.
188

189
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the deficiencies of affiliated interest statutes must be repaired.19 4 PSCs
will also need the incidental power to approve the holding company
format before reorganization,'195 and to have information regarding the
changing corporate structures."9 ' Only with this contextual information
will the records be complete.
However, the regulatory effort must not proceedwithout recognition of the fact that the utility is a profit-making enterprise. 9 ' Regulations must neither impinge on management's ability to manage effectively on a day-to-day basis, nor their ability to seize attractive business
opportunities.'
The following proposal addresses these concerns in
particular detail.
B.

Proposalfor the Effective Regulation of Diversifying Utilities
and the Formation of Holding Companiesfor the Purpose of
Diversification
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: The purpose of this act is
to protect the public interest and to assure the uninterrupted
provision of public utility service at reasonable rates to citizens of this state when public utility corporations become affiliated with companies operating in unregulated industries.
The public interest is protected when the state public service
commission (hereinafter "commission") has sufficient power
and authority to assure that companies affiliated with the
public utility do not benefit from that affiliation at the expense of higher costs of service to utility ratepayers or of unfair competition to competitors without a utility tie.

By emphasizing that the PSC will continue to regulate the utility,
and not the nonutility subsidiaries except as incidental to regulation of
the utility, it is possible to meet the philosophical objections expressed
See supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
197 Utilities in the United States are funded almost exclusively by private and
institutional investors-not the government. Therefore, "[c]ommissions have tried to assure adequate earnings so that the public utility sector could continue to develop and
expand in accordance with consumer demand." C. PHILLIPS, supra note 77, at 153.
The prevailing view of ratemaking in this country was first stated in Federal Power v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). A commission's duty is to set "[riates
which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to
attract capital, and to compensate . . . investors . . . ." Id. at 605.
"8 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
194

195
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in Peoples Energy Corp. and Arizona Public Service."9'
SECTION 1: Definition of Holding Company
"Holding company" means:
(a) Any company which, in any chain of successive
ownership, directly or indirectly owns, holds, or controls
10% or more of the voting securities of a public utility providing energy service in this state, or
(b) Any person or company which the PSC shall determine, after investigation and a hearing on the record, directly or indirectly, alone or in concert with other persons or
companies, exercises such control over the operations, management, or policies of the public utility providing energy
service in this state, as to make necessary protection of the
ratepayers of the utility or consumers.
This section is modeled on the Wisconsin Act,2 00 but sets a higher
ownership threshold before triggering the provisions. The 10% threshold in the proposed act is in line with the affiliated interest statutes of
several states 20 ' and the conclusive presumption of ability to control
under the federal securities laws.20 2
Section 1(b) of the proposed act is essentially a savings clause, encompassing those situations where entities combine to influence the operations of the public utility, but attempts to avoid the strictures of the
act by keeping their ownership below the 10% threshold. The specific
reference to the need for consumer protection covers those situations
where the formation of the holding company may have a minimal im03
pact on ratepayers but significant anti-competitive effects.
SECTION 2: PriorApproval of Commission
(a) No person or company may form a holding company without prior approval of the state public service com199 See supra notes 140-54 & 171-85 and accompanying text. Of course, some
may view this as purely a question of semantics. In these cases, courts read the enabling
statutes of the PSCs as granting jurisdiction over the public utility and not the holding
company, even where the holding company owned nearly 100% of the utility. The
proposed Act emphasizes that any requirements imposed on the holding company are
for the incidental purpose of regulating the utility, and not the holding company itself.
This statement of purpose avoids the appearance of "attempt[ing] to impress a 'public
use' on a business heretofore private. . . ." Lilienthal, The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 434 (1929).
200 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.795(1)(h) (West Supp. 1987) (requiring a 5%
ownership threshold).
201 See supra note 137.
202 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
20 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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mission after a hearing on the record.
(b) The burden shall be on the person or company proposing formation of the holding company to show that the
holding company will not be detrimental to the interests of
the ratepayers of the utility or consumers.
(c) In determining whether formation of the holding
company will be detrimental to the interests of the ratepayers of the utility or consumers, the commission may require
the following information from the person or company proposing formation of the holding company:
(1) a comprehensive list of names and corporate relationships of persons and companies that will be in the holding company system;
(2) a description of how the holding company will be
formed, including copies of the articles of incorporation of all
companies within the proposed holding company system and
copies of any document required "to be filed for approval of
holding company formation under federal securities and
other laws;
(3) a statement and description of the method by which
shared management, personnel, property, administrative, and
any other common expenses will be allocated among the utility and other companies in the holding company system; and
(4) a copy of any agreement or proposed agreement between the public utility and any other company in the proposed holding company system, including but not limited to
any agreement to transfer any asset of the public utility to
any other company in the proposed holding company system.
Section 2 also borrows heavily from the Wisconsin Act.'" However, the proposed statute explicitly states that the burden is on the
person or company proposing formation of the holding company system
to justify formation. Section 2(a) is intended to avoid the problem of a
PSC discovering too late that it might not have jurisdiction over the
holding company system once it is formed by expressly granting the
PSC power to deny formation in the first instance." 5 Section 2(b)
makes clear that the PSC is not to "rubber stamp" the formation of
holding company systems. The information requirements of section 2(c)
See Wis.

STAT. ANN. § 196.795(2)(a) & (b) (West Supp. 1987).
Cf Montana Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 206 Mont. 359, 379, 671
P.2d 604, 615 (1983) (jurisdiction of PSC to approve or disapprove a proposed reorganization unripe for consideration).
204

205
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are meant to ensure that the PSC fully understands the corporate structure of the proposed holding company system and will be able, from the
outset, to monitor the complex issues of cross-subsidization, including
cost allocation and transfer pricing.208
SECTION 3: Powers of Commission with Respect to the
Holding Company System
The commission, in fulfilling its statutory mandate to
protect consumers and ratepayers of the utility, shall have
the power to:
(a) demand access to all books, records, documents, and
other information relating to the utility or any of its affiliates
within the holding company system, except that the commission may not have access to trade secrets unless it is essential
to the protection of the interests of ratepayers or consumers;
(b) detect, identify, review, and approve or disapprove,
with the purpose of eliminating any transaction that appears
contrary to the financial interest of the utility, all transactions between the utility and any affiliated interest within
the holding company system, including but not limited to
any loan or capital transfer involving the utility;
(c) impose maximum limits on the total level of investment in nonutility business, except that the commission, having granted permission to form a holding company system
pursuant to Section 2, shall not have the power of prior approval or disapproval for any particular acquisition;
(d) order a holding company to terminate its interest in
a public utility affiliate on terms adequate to protect the interests of utility investors, ratepayers, and the public, if the
commission finds, after investigation and an adjudicatory
proceeding, that, based upon clear and convincing evidence,
termination of the interest is necessary to protect the interest
of investors in a financially healthy utility and consumers in
adequate utility service at a just and reasonable price.
Section 3 enumerates those powers that are essential to effective
PSC oversight of the holding company system, in comparison to Section
6, which suggests conditions that the PSC may impose on the formation
of the holding company system. Access to affiliates' records is a universal feature of statutes regulating formation of holding company sys20

See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
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tems20 7 and is usually one of the conditions PSCs attempt to impose in
the absence of a statute.20 8
Section 3(b) is modeled on the Maine statute20 9, but identifies a
specific transaction subject to abuse. Some statutes "or PSC conditions
contain an outright ban on loans from utilities to affiliates, 10 but the
proposed act adopts a more moderate view. There can be valid reasons
(for example, cash management) for short-term funds transfers between
a utility affiliate and the holding company. The proposed act gives the
PSC discretion to disallow these transfers when the PSC determines
that there is no valid economic reason for them to take place or if they
will result in a direct or indirect subsidy from the utility to the borrowing entity.
Section 3(c) ensures that the utility business will continue to
predominate in its holding company system. This restriction minimizes
the risk that management's attention will be diverted from the operation of the utility. Subsection (c) also makes clear that the holding company need not secure PSt approval for each individual acquisition, assuring that the holding company will have the flexibility to pursue
opportunities as they arise as well as take advantage of frequently narrow financing windows without the delay that accompanies PSC ap211
proval for individual acquisitions.
Section 3(d) enables the PSC to protect the utility's financial position and ability to access financial markets in the event that an affiliate
encounters serious financial difficulty. This subsection is taken directly
217 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 314(b) (West Supp. 1988) (commission
may inspect books of corporations that hold controlling interest in a public utility, or
any subsidiary or affiliate of such corporation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A,
§ 708(2)(A)(1) (West 1987) (commission has access to books, records, documents, and
other information relating to utilities or their affiliates); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 196.795(5)(b) (West Supp. 1987) (commission has access to any information relating
to a holding company system).
20I See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 155, at 2-4 to -5 (providing
commission with access to "all of the holding company and the affiliates' books and
records"); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 746 P.2d 4, 10 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987) (review granted Dec. 15, 1987) (PSC lacks jurisdiction to order parent of
utility to comply with reporting requirements).
209 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 708(2)(A)(2) (West 1987).
210 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.46(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1987)

("Unless it is authorized to do so by the Commission, no public utility

lend funds to [or] guarantee the obligations of.

.

. . .

shall

...

. any company which is not a public

utility. . ., and which is affiliated. . . with it in the same holding company system.");
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 196.795 (5)(c) (West Supp. 1987) ("No public utility affiliate may

lend money to any holding company which is not a public utility or to any nonutility
affiliate with which it is in the holding company system.").
211 See Kahn, supra note 18, at 157 (arguing against "ex ante" review of individual proposed investments by asserting that "this is a responsibility for which regulators
have no particular competence; they would be foolish to assume it.").
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from the Wisconsin act... and is one of the few sections in the proposed
act that takes into account the interests of investors. Protection is necessary in this case because the PSC can impose action on the holding
company, and the risk of this action is beyond the investor's ability to
control.213
SECTION 4: Obligations of the Holding Company System
The holding company, and any affiliate within the
holding company system as the commission shall require,
shall:
(a) furnish the commission with annual reports concerning the financial operations and condition of the holding
company or such affiliate;
(b) furnish the commission with copies of all reports
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
(c) notify the commission in writing within 15 days following the acquisition of any subsidiary;
(d) provide confidential notice to the commission of the
intent to divest, sell, or transfer any subsidiary prior to such
divestiture;
(e) notify the commission in writing at least 30 days
prior to any transfer of assets between the utility and any
other affiliate within the holding company system, and provide the commission with a written statement of the terms of
such transfer.
This section2" 4 clarifies the obligations of the holding company
system, enabling the PSC to enforce the powers granted it in Section 3.
Section 4(c) recognizes that the PSC does not have the right of prior
approval of holding company acquisitions, but at the same time ensures
that the PSC will be kept up to date on these transactions. Section 4(d)
is not inconsistent with Section 3(c) (dealing with acquisitions of subsidiaries) because Section 4(d) requires prior notice of sales of subsidiaries. The different treatment recognizes a fundamental distinction between acquisition and divestiture-normally speed will only be
important in a divestiture if the sale is a distress sale, in which case the
commission will want to know why. On the other hand, speed may be
important in the event of an acquisition because of financing arrangeSee Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.795(7)(c) (West Supp. 1987).
There might also be constitutional (takings clause) implications if a PSC ordered divestiture without taking the interests of shareholders into account.
214 The section is modeled on the conditions imposed on the proposed reorganization of Southern California Edison Company by the California Public Utilities Commission. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 155, at 2-1 to -4.
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ments or competing bidders. Section 4(e) assures that the commission
will have enough time and information to review intercompany transfers for possible cross-subsidization problems.
SECTION 5: Restrictions on Utilities in Holding Company
Systems
No public utility affiliated with a holding company system shall:
(a) guarantee the notes, debentures, debt obligations, or
other securities of the holding company or any other company in the holding company system;
(b) make any contract with any company in the holding
company system for the purchase and resale by the utility of
[electric energy] [gas];
(c) transfer to any other company within the holding
company system any propietary public utility information
unless the commission has approved the transfer in writing.
These restrictions are drafted in terms of limiting the public utility
in order to avoid the appearance of an unconstitutional regulation of a
non-public service corporation.2 15 The prohibition on guarantees is
found in both the Wisconsin act and the California conditions. 21" There
is no valid cash management reason to allow a utility to guarantee an
affiliate's debt, and guarantee arrangements can significantly boost the
liability of a utility in ways that are susceptible to concealment from
regulators. Section 5(b) prohibits arrangements where the holding company sets up a subsidiary to sell wholesale energy to the utility, which
then resells the energy to its ratepayers.2 17 The purpose of these arrangements is to avoid state regulation of utility rates in favor of the
more liberal attitude towards rate increases at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 218 Regardless of the holding company's motive in
215 See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 746 P.2d 4, 8 n.3
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (review granted Dec. 15, 1987).
218 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.795(5)(d) (West Supp. 1987); CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM'N, supra note 155, at 2-3 (condition 14).
217 See, e.g., Friedlein, Finger & DeLaney, supra note 46, at 22-23 (VEPCO
setting up subsidiary composed of generating plants to sell electricity to holding company at wholesale); Empire State Power Resources, Inc. No. 79-10, (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n April 12, 1979.) [hereinafter ESPRI] (generating subsidiary).
218 See Friedlin, Finger & DeLancy, supra note 46, at 23; ESPRI, supra note
217, at 10-11. There are numerous problems with relying on the FERC to regulate the
transactions of holding companies. See Response of Environmental Action, Western
Shoshone National Council and Citizen Start to "Responses to Objections to Its Application and Exemption and Requests for Hearing," and Comments on Amendments at
13-18, Sierra Pacific Resources, Admin. Proc. 70-7408 (S.E.C. filed Aug. 14, 1987)
(state PSC review will likely be pre-empted by the FERC inquiry into reasonableness
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establishing a generating subsidiary, the function of setting the rates of
public utility service properly belongs to the states. Section 5(c) closely
follows the wording of the Wisconsin act219 and is primarily concerned
with the sharing of customer lists-a practice that gives a nonutility
subsidiary an unfair competitive advantage over competing firms in unregulated business fields. The PSC would have the discretion to disallow the use of those lists, or at least to assure that ratepayers are compensated for their use.
SECTION 6: Other Conditions on Approval
The commission is authorized to attach such other conditions to formation of the holding company system as it
shall deem necessary to fulfill the purposes of this act.
This section grants the PSC authority to negotiate the type of additional conditions that some PSCs have been able to extract even in the
absence of statutory authority."2 For example, the PSC may want to
impose restrictions on dividends paid by the utility to the holding company.2 2' Some states incorporate "capital impairment" provisions into
their statutes. 222 Other states rely on market forces and covenants in
debt agreements to ensure that the utility and the holding company system maintain prudent debt/equity ratios.223 A similar requirement is
not included in the proposed act because the broad grant of authority to
the PSC under Section 3(b) already regulates capital transfers (of
which dividend payments are but one kind) between the utility and
affiliates in the holding company system. The PSC also might consider
a royalty charge payable to the utility by companies in the holding
company system in order to compensate for the intangible benefits of
224
association with the utility.
SECTION 7: Future Review of Utility Holding Companies
The commission shall, by the third anniversary of the
of power supply agreement).

See Wis.

STAT. ANN. § 196.795(5)(h) (West Supp. 1987).
See supra note 155.
221 See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.46(A) (Anderson Supp. 1987) (requiring PSC authorization of all declarations
of dividends).
2
222 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111- /3,
7-103 (Smith-Hurd 1987 Supp.); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 708(2)(A)(3) (West 1987); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 196.795(4) (West Supp. 1987).
2
See, e.g., Virginia Elec. and Power Co., No. PUE 830060 at 5 (Va. State
Corp. Comm'n June 30, 1986) (opinion and final order) ("constraints of the marketplace" make additional financial reporting of utilities unnecessary).
224 See, e.g., Proposed Committee Bill No. 38, Conn. Gen. Assembly, Comm'n on
Energy and Public Utilities (introduced Dec. 8, 1987)(every subsidiary must pay 5% of
gross revenues to utility as compensation for intangible benefits); CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM'N, supra note 155, at 3-1 to -12 (describing nature of intangible benefits).
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formation of the holding company system, and triennially
thereafter, investigate the impact of such holding company
system on the ratepayers of the utility, on consumers, and on
businesses in competition with companies affiliated with the
holding company system. The results of each such investigation shall be compiled in a written report to the legislature.
This section is taken from the Wisconsin act.22 Because the impact of significant diversification is difficult to predict, it makes sense to
periodically assess the effectiveness of the legislation in preventing the
abuses that caused the backlash against holding companies in the
PUHCA.
CONCLUSION

Public utilities are diversifying at an accelerating pace. The abuses
that can attend unrestrained diversification led to a major restructuring
of the entire industry beginning in the 1930s-a colossal task that has
succeeded to a large degree. It is improbable that abuses of that magnitude could accompany the current round of diversification: the state
PSCs are stronger, and the federal government could intervene as an
emergency brake on troubled diversification ventures. Nevertheless, the
SEC seems to be distancing itself from the regulation of routine diversification. In addition, state authorities are discovering that their power
to regulate diversification is not as broad as they believed.
State legislatures should act now to clearly define the ground rules
of diversification. In the process, they will help the utility industry by
removing the uncertainty surrounding the extent and degree of permissible investment in nonutility activity. This Comment has attempted,
through a model statute, to set a framework for effective state
regulation.
At the very least, it is hoped that the proposed act will stimulate
thoughts on how to protect ratepayers from the potential ill effects of
diversification.

22l

See Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§ 196.795(7) (West Supp. 1987).

